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CRIMINAL LAWS AND CONSTITUTIONAL REMEDIES 
John Alexander Robinson∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Can a criminal law remedy a constitutional violation?  In Wilson 
v. Libby, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia 
was faced with that very question.  There, Valerie and John C. Wilson 
sued I. Lewis Libby, Jr., Chief of Staff to Vice President Richard Che-
ney and Assistant for National Security Affairs, alleging that Libby vi-
olated the Wilsons’ First and Fifth Amendment rights by disclosing to 
the public Ms. Wilson’s identity as a CIA agent.1  Premising liability 
under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Nar-
cotics,2 which established that a federal court may, in the absence of 
any congressional authorization, fashion a damages remedy for the 
victim of an unconstitutional act committed by a federal officer if the 
court has jurisdiction to hear the case,3 the Wilsons argued that a 
damages action was necessary because no other congressionally 
created form of relief was adequate to give them recourse.4  Without a 
Bivens remedy, the Wilsons contended that their constitutional rights 
would not be fully vindicated.5 
In turn, Libby argued in part that the court need not create an 
implied action in damages because Congress had already given the 
Wilsons an avenue of recourse—the Intelligent Identities Protection 
Act (IIPA).6  That criminal statute, according to Libby, was sufficient 
 
 ∗ J.D., magna cum laude, 2009, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., magna 
cum laude with honors, 2004, Colgate University.  The author would like to thank Pro-
fessor Thomas Healy, Seton Hall University School of Law, for his insights and sup-
port for this Comment. 
 1 Wilson v. Libby, 498 F. Supp. 2d 74, 77–83 (D.D.C. 2007).  More specifically, 
Ms. Wilson’s name appeared in an article written by Robert Novak, who identified 
Ms. Wilson as a CIA agent.  Id. at 79–80.  That article was published by the Chicago 
Sun Times and the Washington Post on July 14, 2003.  Id.  In their complaint, the Wil-
sons alleged that Vice President Richard Cheney and Libby were involved in “outing” 
Ms. Wilson as an operative.  Id. at 80. 
 2 403 U.S. 388 (1971). 
 3 Id. at 388–90. 
 4 Wilson, 498 F. Supp. 2d at 91. 
 5 Id. 
 6 50 U.S.C. §§ 421–426 (2006).  Under the IIPA, anyone who 
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to address the Wilsons’ constitutional injuries.7  Therefore, Libby 
concluded, the district court should respect Congress’s decision to 
exempt federal officers, such as himself, from damages by declining 
to fashion Bivens relief for injuries arising out of a federal officer’s in-
tentional disclosure of a private citizen’s CIA status.8 
In rejecting Libby’s IIPA argument, the court found that the sta-
tute did not amount to a convincing reason for it to restrain its Bivens 
hand.9  The obvious shortcomings of such a course of action, accord-
ing to the court, were plainly evident.  First, nothing in the text of the 
law or in its legislative history indicated that Congress ever contem-
plated the IIPA to serve as the sole means of recourse for those claim-
ing constitutional injuries for intentional disclosures of their covert 
identity.10  Second, even if such an indication existed, the claim that 
the IIPA was sufficient to address the Wilsons’ constitutional injuries 
was dubious at best because it did not provide them with even the 
possibility of obtaining substantive relief.11  Accordingly, the court 
stated that it would not refrain from giving the Wilsons an adequate 
damages remedy.12 
Although the Wilson court ultimately rejected the plaintiffs’ Bi-
vens claims,13 it seems to have left open the possibility that it would at 
least entertain the argument that a criminal law can remedy a consti-
tutional violation if the criminal law contains some indication that it 
was meant to preempt Bivens relief and provides substantive recom-
pense to the victim of that crime.  Indeed, the claim that a criminal 
law could remedy a constitutional violation seems increasingly meri-
torious given the unwillingness of the Supreme Court of the United 
 
having or having had authorized access to classified information that 
identifies a covert agent, intentionally discloses any information identi-
fying such covert agent to any individual not authorized to receive clas-
sified information, knowing that the information disclosed so identifies 
such covert agent and that the United States is taking affirmative meas-
ures to conceal such covert agent’s intelligence relationship to the 
United States, shall be fined under [T]itle 18 or imprisoned not more 
than ten years, or both. 
Id. § 421(a). 
 7 Wilson, 498 F. Supp. 2d at 85–86. 
 8 Id. 
 9 Id. at 92–93. 
 10 Id. at 92.  Specifically, the court found that “the legislative history shows that 
Congress was responding to a series of high-profile incidents . . . and the IIPA was a 
targeted effort to punish such behavior criminally.”  Id. 
 11 Id. at 92–93; see also 50 U.S.C. §§ 421–426 (2006). 
 12 Wilson, 498 F. Supp. 2d at 92–93. 
 13 Id. at 93. 
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States and lower federal courts to create damages remedies for clai-
mants who lack alternative congressional relief or who can only ob-
tain less-than-adequate relief.14 
The basis for this argument rests, in part, in the Constitution it-
self, which does not on its face delegate a remedy-making power to 
any specific branch of the federal government.15  It has unquestiona-
bly been assumed that Congress naturally possesses a remedy-making 
right because of Congress’s authority to craft substantive laws.16  The 
assumption that the federal courts are also imbued with this power 
has proven to be more controversial, but that controversy has been 
countered on the grounds that federal courts must decide cases and 
controversies (both under the Constitution and federal law) and for 
every right, a remedy must exist, lest the right becomes illusory.17 
But if federal courts do have the statutory and constitutional au-
thority to fashion relief, how can they do so without offending separa-
 
 14 See Cornelia T.L. Pillard, Taking Fiction Seriously: The Strange Results of Public Offi-
cials’ Individual Liability Under Bivens, 88 GEO. L.J. 65, 66 n.6 (1999) (noting that in 
the federal-prisoner litigation context, where most Bivens claims originate, 1513 Bi-
vens claims were filed between 1992 and 1994, but only two resulted in monetary 
judgments, and sixteen resulted in monetary settlements); Perry M. Rosen, The Bi-
vens Constitutional Tort: An Unfulfilled Promise, 67 N.C. L. REV. 337, 344 n.46 (1989) 
(“A Bivens defendant is unlikely to settle . . . because the success rate for such defen-
dants (99.75% before appeal) is so high.  The defendant has no incentive to settle . . 
. because any federal employee sued for actions taken within the scope of his em-
ployment receives free representation from the Department of Justice.”); see generally 
Note, “Damages or Nothing”—The Efficacy of the Bivens-Type Remedy, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 
667 (1979) (arguing that Bivens actions are so unsuccessful that individual govern-
ment officers are unlikely to settle). 
 15 See U.S. CONST. arts. I–III. 
 16 See Walter E. Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The Constitution as a Sword, 85 
HARV. L. REV. 1532, 1548 (1972); Gene R. Nichol, Bivens, Chilicky, and Constitutional 
Damages Claims, 75 VA. L. REV. 1117, 1143–44 (1989) (“[I]t is clear that both Congress 
and the courts are empowered to fashion remedies for the violation of constitutional 
right . . . .  The Supreme Court has regularly reminded us that legislatures are ulti-
mate guardians of the liberties and welfare of the people in quite as great a degree as 
the courts.” (internal citation and quotation marks omitted)). 
 17 See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 
U.S. 388, 395–97 (1971); Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946); Nichol, supra note 
16, at 1122.  Indeed, as far back as Marbury v. Madison, the Court recognized that 
“[t]he government of the United States has been emphatically termed a government 
of laws, and not of men.  It will certainly cease to deserve this high appellation, if the 
laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested legal right.”  Marbury v. Madison, 
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803); but see Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 265–67 
(1978); Richard H. Fallon, Some Confusions About Due Process, Judicial Review, and Con-
stitutional Remedies, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 309, 329–39, 366–72 (1993) (noting that cir-
cumstances exist in which the law provides no remedy for the invasion of a legal in-
terest). 
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tion of powers, especially when Congress has explicitly or implicitly 
excluded damages as a possible remedy against federal officers?  In-
deed, the Supreme Court has largely agreed that federal courts toe, if 
not cross, the separation-of-powers line by giving recourse to a Bivens 
claimant absent congressional authorization.18  In a series of deci-
sions, the Court has strongly suggested that federal courts should re-
frain from crafting Bivens relief and instead defer to congressional 
decisions regarding federal-officer liability for claimed constitutional 
violations.19 
But separation of powers is not an insurmountable bar to a fed-
eral court in fashioning congressionally unauthorized relief for a par-
ticular claimant.20  At least when a claimant has no remedy or no con-
stitutionally adequate remedial process to vindicate the constitutional 
right that has been violated, the Court has found reason to sustain 
Bivens actions.21  The Court, however, has not justified its decisions in 
those instances on the basis that the Constitution or federal law com-
pels the Court to give a remedy to one who lacks any relief; rather, 
the Court has done so on grounds related to fairness to the Bivens 
claimant and the lack of strong federal interests counseling against 
this course of action.22  The importance of that distinction cannot be 
understated.  That distinction suggests that by deferring to statutory 
remedies regarding constitutional violations because of separation-of-
powers concerns, the Court is willing to rely on Congress in giving 
substance and shape to constitutional norms.23  The practical implica-
tion of federal courts deferring to congressional remedies is that in-
 
 18 See, e.g., Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 69 (2001) (noting that “[s]o 
long as the plaintiff had an avenue for some redress, bedrock principles of separa-
tion of powers foreclosed judicial imposition of a new substantive liability” (citing 
Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 425–27 (1988))). 
 19 Wilkie v. Robbins, 127 S. Ct. 2588, 2605 (2007); Malesko, 534 U.S. at 73; FDIC v. 
Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 486 (1994); Chilicky, 487 U.S. at 423–24; United States v. Stan-
ley, 483 U.S. 669, 683–84 (1987); Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 389 (1983); Chappell 
v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 302–05 (1983). 
 20 Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 248 (1979) (finding no constitutional limita-
tion preventing a federal court from fashioning a damages remedy against a federal 
officer for an alleged Equal Protection violation). 
 21 Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 25 (1980); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named 
Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 407–10 (1971) (Harlan, J., 
concurring). 
 22 Bivens, 403 U.S. at 406–08 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 23 Dellinger, supra note 16, at 1548 (arguing that “even where the Court con-
cludes that a particular remedy is ‘part and parcel’ of the underlying constitutional 
right, Congress is not necessarily barred from substituting an alternative remedial 
scheme, provided it affords comparable vindication of the constitutional provision 
involved”). 
ROBINSON (FINAL EDIT) 1/13/2010  5:25 PM 
2009] COMMENT 1363 
 
dividuals, such as the Wilsons, must navigate a maze of complex statu-
tory schemes in search of a remedy that often falls short of making 
them whole.24 
This Comment explores the circumstances in which a congres-
sionally created criminal law is a sufficient reason for a federal court 
to back away from fashioning a damages remedy for the victim of an 
unconstitutional act.  Based on recent Supreme Court jurisprudence 
regarding Bivens claims, this Comment argues that in certain in-
stances a criminal law is adequate to supplant a Bivens remedy.  Part I 
details the few cases in which the Supreme Court has used its powers 
to fashion an implied damages remedy directly from the Constitu-
tion.  Part II addresses the Court’s hesitancy in creating damage relief 
and particularly emphasizes the two general exceptions to Bivens 
claims.  Finally, Part III describes the necessary components of the 
criminal law and the context in which this type of remedy is sufficient 
to preclude a Bivens remedy.  Part III also addresses the shortcomings 
of this approach and discusses the normative justifications for permit-
ting a punitive remedy to guarantee an individual’s constitutional 
right. 
II. BIVENS AND THE PROMISE OF IMPLIED DAMAGES REMEDIES FOR 
CONSTITUTIONAL OFFENSES COMMITTED BY FEDERAL OFFICERS 
A. The Origins of Implied Damages Remedies 
In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Nar-
cotics,25 the Supreme Court of the United States held that a federal 
court, acting under a statutory grant of subject-matter jurisdiction, 
can imply a damages remedy against federal officers who have vi-
olated an individual’s constitutional rights.26  Webster Bivens was at 
home with his family one morning in November 1965 when six 
agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, acting under color of fed-
eral law, entered his dwelling.27  Claiming that he violated certain 
federal drug laws, the agents arrested Bivens, threatened his family, 
examined his home, and subjected him to a strip search.28  Bivens was 
later interrogated, but no federal criminal charges were brought.29  
 
 24 See, e.g., Chilicky, 487 U.S. at 423–24, 427–28. 
 25 403 U.S. 388 (1971). 
 26 Id. at 397. 
 27 Id. at 389. 
 28 Id. 
 29 Id. at 389–90. 
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Arguing that the officers acted without a warrant and had no proba-
ble cause for his arrest, Bivens sued them for money damages in fed-
eral district court for violating his Fourth Amendment rights.30  The 
Federal District Court for the Eastern District of New York and the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit dismissed Bivens’s case 
for failing to state a cause of action because he lacked statutory au-
thority to sue federal officers for monetary damages for Fourth 
Amendment violations, and Bivens appealed to the Supreme Court.31 
Rather than dismissing the case as the lower courts had done, 
the Court entertained Bivens’s claim.32  The Court justified that deci-
sion on the grounds that it had subject-matter jurisdiction under the 
federal-question statute33 and that “where legal rights have been in-
vaded, and a federal statute provides for a general right to sue for 
such invasion, federal courts may use any available remedy to make 
good the wrong done.”34  As such, the question before the Court was 
whether the Fourth Amendment permitted Bivens to exact money 
damages from federal officers for their invasion of his rights.35  The 
Court found particularly crucial the fact that a damages remedy was 
Bivens’s only hope of relief: the exclusionary rule of the Fourth 
Amendment, prohibiting a prosecutor from using or relying upon 
evidence illegally obtained by federal officers,36 did not apply because 
no criminal proceeding was brought against Bivens,37 and state tort 
remedies were “inconsistent [with] or even hostile” to the guarantees 
of the Fourth Amendment.38  Further, the Court determined that 
damages were the “ordinary remedy for an invasion of personal in-
terests in liberty.”39 
 
 30 Id.  Bivens sought $15,000 in monetary damages from each officer for their ac-
tions.  Id. 
 31 Bivens, 403 U.S. at 389–90. 
 32 Id. at 389. 
 33 Id. at 398–99 (Harlan, J., concurring).  At the time that Bivens was decided, the 
federal-question statute provided that “[t]he district courts shall have original juris-
diction of all civil actions wherein the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value 
of $10,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and arises under the Constitution, laws, or 
treaties of the United States.”  28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1976). 
 34 Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396 (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946)). 
 35 Id. at 389. 
 36 See generally Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920); 
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) (holding that evidence obtained in con-
travention of the Fourth Amendment cannot be used in a federal criminal proceed-
ing). 
 37 Bivens, 403 U.S. at 394–95. 
 38 Id. at 394. 
 39 Id. at 395. 
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Although finding that the Fourth Amendment permitted an ac-
tion in damages, the Court stated that its inquiry did not end there.40  
Rather, the Court suggested that it would refrain from crafting relief 
if there was an “explicit congressional declaration that persons in-
jured by a federal officer’s violation of the Fourth Amendment may 
not recover money damages from the agents” or any “special factors 
counsel[ing] hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Con-
gress.”41  Finding that neither exception applied to the case at hand, 
the Court permitted Bivens to seek monetary damages against the 
federal transgressors.42 
In a notable and revealing concurring opinion, Justice Harlan 
made clear that the Court did not need statutory authority from 
Congress to accord compensatory relief to Bivens.43  According to Jus-
tice Harlan, federal courts had the “presumed” power to fashion 
equitable relief directly under the Constitution based on a general 
statutory grant of subject-matter jurisdiction.44  Thus, Justice Harlan 
argued, the belief that the federal tribunals lacked the authority to 
imply a damages remedy directly under the Constitution based on that 
same general statutory grant of subject-matter jurisdiction was inde-
fensible, if not illogical.45  Further, Justice Harlan stressed that the 
fact that the federal tribunals routinely implied damages remedies in-
to statutory schemes mooted the criticism that the Court was imper-
missibly making substantive relief for Bivens.46  That proved, Justice 
Harlan continued, that the federal courts were more than capable of 
making the considered policy decisions normally thought to be re-
served for Congress.47  Moreover, Justice Harlan emphasized that the 
Bill of Rights existed to “vindicate the interests of the individual in 
the face of the popular will as expressed in legislative majorities,” 
which suggested that federal courts had to distance themselves from 
expressed congressional desires regarding constitutional remedies.48  
 
 40 Id. at 396–97. 
 41 Id. 
 42 Id. 
 43 Bivens, 403 U.S. at 399–400, 402–07 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 44 Id. at 404. 
 45 Id. at 404–06. 
 46 Id. at 402–03 (citing J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432–34 (1964)).  Not-
ably, the practice of implying private remedies into statutory schemes was later dis-
credited and abandoned by the Court.  See, e.g., Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 
677 (1979).  In Bivens, the Court implied a damages remedy directly from the Consti-
tution itself.  See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396–97. 
 47 Bivens, 403 U.S. at 402–03. 
 48 Id. at 407. 
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To him, the question was whether compensatory relief was “‘neces-
sary’ or ‘appropriate’ to the vindication of the interest asserted.”49  
Justice Harlan wrote that “[i]n resolving that question, . . . the range 
of policy considerations we may take into account is at least as broad 
as the range [] a legislature would consider with respect to an express 
statutory authorization of a traditional remedy.”50  In considering the 
“traditional judicial remedies” used by federal courts to vindicate a 
legal interest,51 Justice Harlan concluded that a damages remedy was 
“appropriate” because for Bivens “it is damages or nothing.”52 
In Davis v. Passman,53 the Court applied the reasoning of Bivens 
in implying a damages action directly under the Fifth Amendment.54  
In that case, Davis brought an equal-protection claim against her em-
ployer, Congressman Otto Passman, because he fired her on account 
of her gender.55  Davis sought monetary and equitable relief for her 
injuries against Passman, but Davis lacked statutory authority to sue a 
member of Congress for the violation that she asserted.56  The Court 
relied heavily on Bivens in stating that damages were appropriate be-
cause it had general subject-matter jurisdiction to hear Davis’s consti-
tutional claims57 and because Davis could not avail herself of any al-
ternative federal remedy.58  Finding damages to be the traditional 
form of relief for equal protection infringements,59 the Court found 
 
 49 Id. 
 50 Id. 
 51 Id. at 408 n.8. 
 52 Id. at 410. 
 53 442 U.S. 228 (1979). 
 54 Id. at 248. 
 55 Id. at 230.  Representative Passman stated that he fired Davis from her position 
as his administrative assistant because he preferred a man for the job.  Id. 
 56 Id. at 231.  Specifically, Davis sought reinstatement of her position as an admin-
istrative assistant; however, because Passman had resigned from the House of Repre-
sentatives by the time of Davis’s lawsuit, her claims for reinstatement were unavailing.  
Id.  Davis had no standing to sue under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 because § 717 of 
Title VII of that Act, as amended in 1972, excluded congressional employees from 
protection.  Equal Opportunity Employment Act of 1972, § 717, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 
11, 86 Stat. 103, 111–12 (1972) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 
(2006)).  Nor did Davis have any standing to sue Passman for violating the rules of 
conduct governing the House of Representatives because those rules were promul-
gated and adopted after the alleged unconstitutional behavior occurred.  Davis, 442 
U.S. at 243 n.21. 
 57 Davis, 442 U.S. at 236. The Court considered § 1331(a), the statute for federal-
question jurisdiction, to be the basis for Davis to sue for an invasion of her constitu-
tional right.  Id. 
 58 Id. at 243–44 n.21, 245–46. 
 59 Id. at 245. 
ROBINSON (FINAL EDIT) 1/13/2010  5:25 PM 
2009] COMMENT 1367 
 
neither an explicit congressional declaration nor any special factors 
counseling hesitation against giving Davis recourse.60  Accordingly, 
the Court sustained Davis’s claims for direct monetary relief against 
Passman for his unconstitutional behavior.61 
The last case to extend Bivens was Carlson v. Green,62 in which the 
Court applied the doctrine to an Eighth Amendment violation.63  Un-
like Bivens and Davis, the plaintiff in this case was not without re-
course: the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) provided the decedent’s 
estate with a damages action against the Federal Bureau of Prisons.64  
Thus, the Court faced the question of whether to extend Bivens relief 
to a plaintiff who could avail himself of alternative congressional re-
lief.65  In deciding in the affirmative, the Court found in the FTCA’s 
legislative history that Congress intended to preserve Bivens claims, 
which silenced the argument that the FTCA represented an express 
declaration by Congress that Bivens relief was precluded.66  Further, 
the Court reasoned that even if such language did not exist, an im-
plied damages remedy was appropriate because the FTCA was wholly 
inadequate to relieve the injuries claimed by the decedent’s estate.67  
The Court particularly was concerned with the fact that, unlike the 
FTCA’s remedies, damages against federal officers would deter them 
from engaging in unconstitutional behavior in the future.68  Because 
of the FTCA’s inadequacy, the Court found no impediment to fa-
shioning a freestanding damages remedy for the plaintiff.69 
 
 60 Id. at 246–48. 
 61 Id. at 248–49. 
 62 446 U.S. 14 (1980). 
 63 Id. at 16.  In Carlson, a federal prisoner suffered an acute asthmatic attack while 
in the custody of officials of the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP).  Id. at 16 n.1.  The 
prison officials failed to timely treat or find help for the prisoner, who subsequently 
died from his ailment.  Id. at 16.  The prisoner’s estate then sued the federal officers 
for money damages.  Id. 
 64 Id. at 19–20; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1970). 
 65 Carlson, 446 U.S. at 19–20. 
 66 Id. 
 67 Id. at 21.  Specifically, the Court reasoned that the FTCA remedies were inade-
quate to preclude the Court from implying a Bivens damages remedy for four rea-
sons: (1) a Bivens remedy had more of a deterrent effect on the individual federal of-
ficer who has committed the constitutional violation; (2) a Bivens suit allows for 
punitive damages, while the remedies offered by the FTCA do not; (3) a plaintiff in-
voking the FTCA remedies is not entitled to a trial by jury; and (4) a plaintiff at-
tempting to invoke the remedies under the FTCA must prove that he would have 
standing to sue in the state where the particular misconduct occurred.  Id. at 20–23. 
 68 Id. at 21. 
 69 Id. at 25. 
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B. Bivens as Constitutional Common Law 
Despite the apparent simplicity of the doctrine—that a federal 
court can create a damages remedy for a plaintiff who has suffered a 
constitutional injury at the hands of a federal officer if the court has 
subject-matter jurisdiction to hear the case70—Bivens has generated 
substantial debate over the extent to which the Constitution compels 
a federal court to fashion a remedy in damages for an otherwise re-
medy-less plaintiff.71  Indeed, a cursory reading of Bivens, Davis, and 
Carlson suggests that when a plaintiff lacks a constitutionally adequate 
remedy and a federal court has subject-matter jurisdiction to hear his 
claim, the Constitution in fact commands the federal courts to give 
the plaintiff some form of recourse.72  Therefore, when damages are 
 
 70 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 
U.S. 388, 399 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring).  Notably (despite being beyond the 
scope of this Comment), that statement presents an interesting question regarding 
the federal judiciary’s role in regard to Congress within the system of separation of 
powers.  In the context of a Bivens claim, the question can be phrased as the follow-
ing: would a federal court have the power to hear a Bivens claim and imply a damages 
remedy for a constitutional violation committed by a federal officer if Congress has 
not provided the victim of the wrongdoing with a constitutionally adequate remedy 
and has also repealed § 1331?  Perhaps an even more interesting question is whether 
Bivens can be read to give state courts the power to fashion freestanding constitu-
tional remedies given that Congress does not have to create lower federal courts at 
all.  Several scholars have discussed those and related questions.  See generally Akhil 
Amar, Five Views of Federalism: “Converse—1983” in Context, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1229 
(1994); Akhil Amar, Using State Law to Protect Federal Constitutional Rights: Some Ques-
tions and Answers About Converse—1983, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 159 (1993); Dellinger, su-
pra note 16; Nichol, supra note 16; Rosen, supra note 14; Joan Steinman, Backing Off 
Bivens and the Ramifications of This Retreat for the Vindication of First Amendment Rights, 
83 MICH. L. REV. 269 (1984). 
 71 Compare Thomas S. Schrock & Robert C. Welsh, Reconsidering the Constitutional 
Common Law, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1117, 1135–36 (1978) (“Bivens is a constitutional (not 
common law) decision.  It is a constitutional decision, we believe, because it prevents 
the Fourth Amendment from being rendered a ‘mere form of words’ in the relevant 
sense of that phrase.”), with George D. Brown, Letting Statutory Tails Wag Constitutional 
Dogs—Have the Bivens Dissenters Prevailed?, 64 IND. L.J. 263, 291 (1989) (“The view 
that Bivens is constitutional law in the sense of being compelled by the document it-
self, fairly interpreted, has attracted some academic support . . . .  [I]t is a somewhat 
stretched reading of Bivens itself, let alone subsequent cases.”), and Henry P. Monag-
han, The Supreme Court 1974 Term: Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. 
REV. 1, 28 (1975) (suggesting that the Bivens decision is an example of the Court’s 
constitutional common-law powers).  See also Nichol, supra note 16, at 1124. 
 72 Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 242 (1979) (“[W]e presume that justiciable 
constitutional rights are to be enforced through the courts.  And, unless such rights 
are to become merely precatory, the class of those litigants who allege that their own 
constitutional rights have been violated, and who at the same time have no effective 
means other than the judiciary to enforce these rights, must be able invoke the exist-
ing jurisdiction of the courts for the protection of their justiciable constitutional 
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the “ordinary” mode of vindication for the infringed right, federal 
courts have the duty to fashion that type of relief for the claimant.73 
But if this is so, then it is difficult to reconcile that understand-
ing of the doctrine with the Court’s practice in determining whether 
a claimant has alternative remedies.74  Why should a federal court 
care about other congressional remedies if the constitutional right in 
question demands a damages action when that right is violated?  Even 
assuming that the purpose of this inquiry is to see if the claimant al-
ready has adequate recourse that makes added relief unnecessary,75 
the Bivens exceptions themselves cast doubt on the constitutional un-
derpinnings of the doctrine.  One way to account for the exceptions 
is to say that when neither applies to a particular case, then the Con-
stitution compels a damages remedy for an individual with no alter-
native, adequate relief.76  The Court, however, in later cases has im-
plicitly rejected that approach because the Court has stated that a 
Bivens damages remedy must be the “best way to implement a consti-
tutional guarantee” and “is not an automatic entitlement no matter 
what other means there may be to vindicate a protected interest.”77  
Thus, even if an individual has no other remedy and damages are 
“ordinary” for the asserted right that has been violated, a Bivens ac-
tion may still not be the “best way” for a federal court to proceed.78 
Perhaps the one way to read Bivens and its two exceptions as a 
coherent rule is to consider it completely within the federal court’s 
 
rights.”) (emphasis added); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bu-
reau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971) (noting that “‘[t]he very essence of civil 
liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the 
laws, whenever he receives an injury’” (emphasis added) (quoting Marbury v. Madi-
son, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803))). 
 73 Bivens, 403 U.S. at 408 n.8 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“[A] court of law vested 
with jurisdiction over the subject matter of a suit has the power—and therefore the du-
ty—to make principled choices among traditional judicial remedies.”) (emphasis 
added). 
 74 See, e.g., Davis, 442 U.S. at 245 (noting that plaintiff had no alternative form of 
recourse). 
 75 The claimant, however, unlikely would have adequate recourse because if the 
claimant has a congressionally created damages remedy at his disposal, he would 
have no need to bring the Bivens action in the first instance unless, as Wilson v. Libby, 
498 F. Supp. 2d 74 (D.D.C. 2007), demonstrates, his congressional remedy in dam-
ages is directed against a federal agency rather than against a federal officer, and the 
plaintiff desires to collect from the officer personally. 
 76 Davis, 442 U.S. at 242–45; Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397–98. 
 77 Wilkie v. Robbins, 127 S. Ct. 2588, 2597 (2007). 
 78 The Court has yet to address the question of whether the “best way” is code for 
“required by the constitutional right in question.”  The Court likely would not hold 
that way, however, given the circular nature of that argument. 
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discretion to fashion a damages remedy for an alleged unconstitu-
tional act committed by a federal officer.79  Under this view of Bivens, 
the Constitution does not compel but, rather, merely permits federal 
courts to fashion adequate relief for a claimant who lacks it (assum-
ing, of course, that the court has jurisdiction to entertain the claim).80  
Federal courts, in the view of Justice Harlan, use reasoned judgment 
to determine if a Bivens remedy is the “best way” to vindicate a consti-
tutional right in a particular case.81  That necessarily involves balanc-
ing the individual’s need to obtain recompense against the concerns 
codified in the two Bivens exceptions, which generally touch on 
broader governmental and constitutional values.82  Clearly, the fact 
that a claimant has no remedy is material to this balancing of inter-
ests, but it may not be decisive.83  Although the distinction between 
Bivens as a constitutional decision and Bivens as a “constitutional 
common law”84 decision appears academic, it has been crucial to the 
Court’s understanding of and attitudes toward the doctrine in later 
cases. 
III. THE EXCEPTIONS BECOME THE LAW: WHEN SPECIAL  
FACTORS PRECLUDE IMPLIED DAMAGES REMEDIES 
In the twenty-eight years since Carlson, the Court has declined to 
extend Bivens to any new contexts85 and has cautioned against fa-
shioning a freestanding remedy in damages except in the narrowest 
circumstances.86  A few current justices have even gone so far as to call 
 
 79 See Wilkie, 127 S. Ct. at 2597; see also Bivens, 403 U.S. at 407 (Harlan, J., concur-
ring). 
 80 Davis, 442 U.S. at 252 (Powell, J., dissenting); Brown, supra note 71, at 291; 
Monaghan, supra note 71, at 28. 
 81 Bivens, 403 U.S. 407–08 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 82 See, e.g., id. 
 83 See, e.g., Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 70 (2001); United States v. 
Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 683 (1987); Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 305 (1983). 
 84 This term was coined by Professor Monaghan in his influential article The Su-
preme Court 1974 Term: Foreward: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1 
(1975). 
 85 In the past decade, the Supreme Court has only heard two Bivens cases and has 
declined to extend the doctrine in both instances.  In Malesko, 534 U.S. at 68 (2001), 
the Court remarked that “[s]ince Carlson we have consistently refused to extend Bi-
vens liability to any new context or new category of defendants.”  Similarly, in Wilkie v. 
Robbins, 127 S. Ct. 2588, 2604–05 (2007), the Court expressed great caution in imply-
ing a damages remedy for any unconstitutional act committed by a federal officer.  
Id. at 2597–98. 
 86 See Wilkie, 127 S. Ct. at 2604–05; Malesko, 534 U.S. at 68; Schweiker v. Chilicky, 
487 U.S. 412, 421 (1988). 
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an end to the practice of implying remedies for constitutional viola-
tions in all instances.87  Federal circuit and district courts almost un-
iversally deny Bivens remedies, and federal officers rarely settle Bivens-
style cases against them because of the low success rate of those cas-
es.88  What can explain the Court’s near complete reversal in its atti-
tude toward implied damages remedies against federal officers? 
Since its inception, the Bivens doctrine has been rife with con-
troversy.89  The main criticism of Bivens, one which has resonated 
most loudly in the Court’s recent decisions involving the doctrine, is 
that it undermines separation of powers.90  Indeed, if the Constitution 
does not compel damages actions to vindicate a specific constitution-
al right (a supposition which the Court seems to have embraced in its 
most recent cases91), then it would appear that a federal court acting 
under its Bivens power judicially crafts substantive relief.92  Not only 
do federal courts lack the institutional competence to weigh compet-
ing policy considerations in fashioning remedies,93 but any decisions 
that federal courts make regarding a federal officer’s liability in dam-
ages necessarily impermissibly chills federal decision making.94  Un-
 
 87 See Wilkie, 127 S. Ct. at 2608 (Thomas, J., concurring); see also Malesko, 534 U.S. 
at 75 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Bivens is a relic of the heady days in which this Court 
assumed common-law powers to create causes of action—decreeing them to be ‘im-
plied’ by the mere existence of a statutory or constitutional prohibition . . . .  I would 
limit Bivens . . . to the precise circumstances that they involved.”). 
 88 See supra note 14. 
 89 Brown, supra note 71, at 264–67. 
 90 See, e.g., Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 53–54 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissent-
ing); Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 253 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting) (The Court 
must show “comity toward an equal and coordinate branch of government . . . .  Even 
where the authority of one branch over a matter is not exclusive . . . we have recog-
nized that the principle of separation of powers continues to have force as a matter 
of policy.”); Davis, 442 U.S. at 249–50 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
 91 Wilkie, 127 S. Ct. at 2597–99; Malesko, 534 U.S. at 68–71; FDIC v. Meyer, 510 
U.S. 471, 484–486 (1994); Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 421–22 (1988); United 
States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 681 (1987); Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 388–90 
(1983); Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 304 (1983). 
 92 Bush, 462 U.S. at 388–90; Carlson, 446 U.S. at 53–54 (Rehnquist, J. dissenting); 
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 430 
(1971) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court should not be making 
“judicial legislation” by implying a damages remedy when Congress had not provided 
one). 
 93 See, e.g., Chilicky, 487 U.S. at 425–27; Carlson, 446 U.S. at 52–53 (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting); Bivens, 403 U.S. at 412 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (noting that Congress 
“has the facilities and competence” for the task of creating legislation and accompa-
nying remedies). 
 94 Carlson, 446 U.S. at 47 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
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der this view of Bivens,95 a federal court usurps Congress’s prerogative 
to make laws, incidental to which is the power to create remedies.96  
Such separation-of-powers concerns therefore trump an individual’s 
need for a remedy in damages in most, if not all, cases because the 
Constitution does not require such a remedy to exist in the first 
place.97  Even if the Constitution gives federal courts the ability to 
create constitutional remedies, federal courts should not (and per-
haps cannot) do so unless Congress has explicitly or implicitly re-
served room for the courts to exercise that power.98  In the absence of 
an express congressional declaration to preserve Bivens, separation of 
powers demands the federal courts’ respect for congressionally 
created relief.99 
Most commentators have roundly criticized the Court for refus-
ing to recognize the federal judiciary’s duty to fashion relief for a re-
 
 95 On the other hand, if one views federal-court action as constitutionally man-
dated when a claimant has no remedy, then the dispute over Bivens takes on a great-
er constitutional dimension.  At that level, the attack on Bivens as judicial lawmaking 
resonates with less clarity because a federal court is not “making” substantive law so 
much as it is finding that the Constitution requires a damages remedy that Congress 
has failed to provide.  Rather, that disagreement over Bivens reflects a more funda-
mental disagreement about the constitutional justifications for permitting federal 
courts to create remedies based solely on their “inherent” powers when acting under 
a transient grant of statutory jurisdiction.  That was the position taken by then-Justice 
Rehnquist in Carlson.  According to Justice Rehnquist, a statutory grant of jurisdic-
tion by Congress was insufficient authority for a federal court to create a damages 
remedy against a federal officer for the officer’s unconstitutional behavior.  Id. at 41.  
Interestingly, Rehnquist believed that a federal court had the power to fashion equit-
able relief based on a statutory grant of jurisdiction because federal courts historical-
ly wielded such power.  Id. at 42–44.  Justice Rehnquist later abandoned that view by 
the time the Court decided Correctional Services Corporation v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 66–
67 (2001). 
 96 When Congress expressly or implicitly exempts federal officers from damages 
actions, a federal court exacting Bivens relief is, in one sense, acting in contravention 
to what Congress deems appropriate (or rather inappropriate) relief for the alleged 
constitutional injury.  Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 249–50 (1979) (Burger, C.J., 
dissenting); Bivens, 403 U.S. at 411–12 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); see also Nichol, supra 
note 16, at 1143. 
 97 Wilkie v. Robbins, 127 S. Ct. 2588, 2597–600 (2007); Malesko, 534 U.S. at 69–70; 
Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 421–22 (1983). 
 98 Wilkie, 127 S. Ct. at 2600 (“It would be hard to infer that Congress expected the 
Judiciary to stay its Bivens hand . . . .”); Malesko, 534 U.S. at 69 (“So long as the plain-
tiff had an avenue for some redress, bedrock principles of separation of powers fo-
reclosed judicial imposition of a new substantive liability.”). 
 99 Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 423 (1988) (noting that “[w]hen the de-
sign of a Government program suggests that Congress has provided what it considers 
adequate remedial mechanisms for constitutional violations that may occur in the 
course of its administration, [the Court] ha[s] not created additional Bivens reme-
dies”). 
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medy-less plaintiff.100  They argue that if the Constitution does not 
compel the federal courts to find a remedy for a claimant who lacks 
one, then the judicial branch is relegated to a secondary role in the 
enforcement of constitutional norms.101  Congress would, in effect, 
dictate the mode of vindication regarding constitutional rights and 
tangentially control their interpretations.102  Further, even if the Con-
stitution does not force the federal courts’ hands when the courts are 
presented with a remedy-less plaintiff, the commentators attack as il-
logical the general hesitancy of those tribunals to fashion Bivens relief 
under the guise of judicial lawmaking.103  The idea that Congress can 
fashion remedies is premised on Congress’s power to enact legisla-
tion and create legal rights in the first instance.104  But Congress does 
not create constitutional rights; those rights come from the People.105  
Thus, the demands for respecting separation of powers seem less 
pressing, even non-existent, in the case of constitutional remedies be-
cause the federal courts are giving effect to guarantees that are not 
the product of Congress.106 
Those arguments, however, have fallen mostly on deaf ears 
among the justices of the Court.  In practice, the distaste for Bivens 
manifests itself in the federal courts’ policy of deference toward statu-
tory and administrative remedies.107  The breadth of that deference 
has become so substantial that it is now assumed that statutory re-
gimes foreclose Bivens relief unless Congress expressly intends to pre-
serve it.108  That is true even when the statutory remedy is either in-
adequate as compared to an implied damages remedy109 or wholly 
unavailable to a particular claimant.110  The end result has been a 
 
 100 Susan Bandes, Reinventing Bivens: The Self-Executing Constitution, 68 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 289, 303–05 (1995); Brown, supra note 71, at 285–86; Nichol, supra note 16, at 
1132; Rosen, supra note 14, at 337–40; Steinman, supra note 70, at 281. 
 101 Bandes, supra note 100, at 320–22; Nichol, supra note 16, at 1132. 
 102 Bandes, supra note 100, at 316; Brown, supra note 71, at 285–86. 
 103 See Bandes, supra note 100, at 316 (arguing that “[e]ven under a rigidly separa-
tionist view of the Constitution, when considered in light of the core judicial role of 
giving meaning to constitutional values as a bulwark against government overreach-
ing, judicial remedies are not merely legitimate, but crucial”); see also Brown, supra 
note 71, at 285–86; Steinman, supra note 70, at 295–96. 
 104 Nichol, supra note 16, at 1129–30. 
 105 U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
 106 Brown, supra note 71, at 285–86; Steinman, supra note 70, at 281. 
 107 See Bandes, supra note 100, at 294; Rosen, supra note 14, at 338. 
 108 Brown, supra note 71, at 286. 
 109 See, e.g., Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 426–27 (1988). 
 110 See, e.g., United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 682 (1988); Chappell v. Wallace, 
462 U.S. 296, 301–02 (1983). 
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near complete subversion of the Bivens doctrine through the use of 
its two exceptions.111  As one commentator aptly put it, “Bivens con-
tained the seeds of its own demise.”112 
A. The Bivens Exceptions: When Congress Expressly “Says So” 
Under Bivens, when Congress expressly declares one of its reme-
dies to be the sole form of relief for a victim of an unconstitutional 
act, a federal court is incontestably precluded from implying an addi-
tional remedy in damages.113  For that exception to apply, Congress 
need not recite any special words or proclaim that a particular reme-
dy excludes a Bivens damages remedy.114  If the legislative history or 
any other source evinces congressional intent to make a particular 
remedy the exclusive form of relief for a particular constitutional vi-
olation, an implied Bivens remedy cannot be sustained.115 
Although the Court has reiterated that test in numerous cases,116 
it has yet to find a law that satisfies the first Bivens exception.117  How 
directly Congress must speak to trigger the first exception is unclear, 
but the Court’s decisions indicate that only an express and unequi-
vocal statement by Congress will preempt Bivens.118  Presumably, when 
Congress has in fact spoken, the Court’s role is solely to determine 
whether the congressional relief is nonetheless constitutionally ade-
quate to vindicate the underlying right.119 
B. The Bivens Exceptions: When Special Factors Counsel Hesitation 
The special-factors exception is the main vehicle that the Court 
uses to defeat attempts at resurrecting Bivens, and that exception is 
 
 111 Brown, supra note 71, at 264–66. 
 112 Bandes, supra note 100, at 291. 
 113 See Nichol, supra note 16, at 1143. 
 114 Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 20 n.5 (1980). 
 115 Id. 
 116 See, e.g., id. at 19; Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 247 (1979). 
 117 See, e.g., Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 378 (1983); Carlson, 446 U.S. at 22–24. 
 118 Carlson, 446 U.S. at 20 n.5. 
 119 That is because without a finding of constitutional adequacy by the Court, the 
remedy would not serve its purpose of vindicating the underlying constitutional 
right.  If the Court were to approve a remedy that did not pass constitutional muster, 
significant due process concerns would ensue for the victim of the act and separa-
tion-of-powers concerns would also arise.  See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents 
of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 407 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring).  
Commentators agree that the Court must at least ensure that congressional remedies 
meet certain minimum criteria.  Dellinger, supra note 16, at 1549; Nichol, supra note 
16, at 1143; Steinman, supra note 70, at 281. 
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rooted in the belief that a Bivens remedy offends “bedrock principles 
of separation of powers.”120  The clearest examples of that exception 
involve claimed constitutional violations arising out of federal activi-
ties, such as military service, where the Constitution expressly gives 
another branch of government near complete authority or control.121  
In such cases, a federal court using its Bivens power is ostensibly act-
ing without constitutional authority to do so.122  Where there is no di-
rect constitutional provision justifying Bivens preclusion, the affront 
to “bedrock principles” manifests itself most commonly in a federal 
court’s failure to show comity toward congressional decisions regard-
ing federal-officer liability.123  At least when Congress has created a 
statutory scheme, the design of which implies an intent to exclude 
federal officers from damages for violations of that statute, the con-
cerns over Bivens as sounding in judicial lawmaking resonate with 
particular clarity.124  In other situations, the offense is more subtle and 
arises out of concern over the federal judiciary’s competency to weigh 
competing policy concerns when asked to extend Bivens liability 
beyond the unconstitutional acts of federal officers.125  Regardless of 
the reasoning used by a federal court, however, the special factors ex-
ception has clearly proven to be an incredibly malleable standard that 
has been used by courts to avoid fashioning an implied damages re-
medy in almost all contexts.126 
1. Special Factors: Constitutional Violations Incidental  
to Federal Military Service 
The criticism that Bivens steps beyond the parameters of separa-
tion of powers is most vividly apparent when federal courts are asked 
to imply a damages remedy for constitutional injuries arising out of a 
claimant’s military service.127  Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution 
states that Congress has the power to “make rules for the Govern-
 
 120 Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 69 (2001). 
 121 See, e.g., United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 684 (1987). 
 122 Id. at 682–84. 
 123 Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 423 (1988). 
 124 Id. 
 125 Malesko, 534 U.S. at 70–71; FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 485 (1994). 
 126 See, e.g., Wilkie v. Robbins, 127 S. Ct. 2588, 2604–05 (2007) (holding that the 
“serious difficultly of devising a workable cause of action” amounted to a special fac-
tor for precluding Bivens liability); Meyer, 510 U.S. at 486 (holding, in part, that a Bi-
vens action directly against a federal agency amounted to a special factor because of 
the “potentially enormous financial burden for the Federal Government”). 
 127 United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 684 (1987). 
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ment and Regulation of the land and naval Force . . . .”128  When a 
federal court implies a damages remedy against a military officer, the 
court gives the claimant substantive relief in the absence of congres-
sional authorization.129  That would seem to directly flout Article I’s 
language, which calls on Congress to make those types of liability de-
cisions involving military officers.130  Recognizing this conflict, the 
Court has ruled that federal courts cannot fashion Bivens relief in that 
area.131  Rather, a court’s duty is merely to ensure that adequate re-
medies are on the books to redress a plaintiff’s injury.132  Whether the 
claimant can actually obtain recompense under those schemes is of 
no consequence.133 
Chappell v. Wallace134 illustrates that point.  In Chappell, the plain-
tiffs were naval servicemen who were discriminated against on ac-
count of their race, and they sued their commanding officers on the 
basis of equal-protection violations.135  The plaintiffs attempted to 
hold their superiors liable under the Uniform Code of Military Jus-
tice (UCMJ);136 however, the UCMJ required that other superior of-
ficers bring forth the plaintiffs’ claims before a military tribunal.137  
After no such superior officer asserted the plaintiffs’ claims, the 
 
 128 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14. 
 129 Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 301 (1983). 
 130 Id. at 301–04. 
 131 Stanley, 483 U.S. at 682. 
 132 Chappell, 462 U.S. at 304. 
 133 Stanley, 483 U.S. at 706 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that “no intramilitary 
system” existed that provided the plaintiff with a remedy for his constitutional in-
jury). 
 134 462 U.S. 296 (1983). 
 135 Id. at 297.  Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that their commanding officers 
had denied them promotions and exacted harsher penalties on them because of 
their race.  Id. 
 136 10 U.S.C. § 938 (1976). 
 137 In pertinent part, the UCMJ states the following: 
Any member of the armed forces who believes himself wronged by his 
commanding officer, and who, upon due application to that com-
manding officer, is refused redress, may complain to any superior 
commissioned officer, who shall forward the complaint to the officer 
exercising general court-martial jurisdiction over the officer against 
whom it is made.  The officer exercising general court-martial jurisdic-
tion shall examine into the complaint and take proper measures for 
redressing the wrong complained of; and he shall, as soon as possible, 
send to the Secretary concerned a true statement of that complaint, 
with the proceedings had thereon. 
Id. § 938, art. 138. 
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plaintiffs petitioned the Court to provide them with a remedy in 
damages because they had no alternative recourse.138 
In rejecting the plaintiffs’ Bivens claim, the Court stated that the 
Constitution gave Congress near “plenary control over rights, duties, 
and responsibilities in the framework of the military establishment, 
including regulations, procedures, and remedies related to military 
discipline.”139  Acting pursuant to that power, Congress created the 
UCMJ and the Board for the Correction of Naval Records, both of 
which, according to the Court, adequately addressed the plaintiffs’ 
claimed injuries.140  A Bivens remedy, the Court wrote, would make 
federal officers liable in damages when Congress had not provided 
for such liability in either of its remedial statutes.  The mere threat of 
liability would have the undesirable consequence of chilling “decisive 
action” on the part of commanding officers and the “disciplined re-
sponse” of their subordinates.141  That, in turn, would significantly al-
ter “the unique disciplinary structure of the [m]ilitary” that Congress 
had created and undermine Article I’s directive for Congress to make 
regulations regarding the military.142  Further, even if Article I could 
somehow be read to permit the Court to fashion relief for the plain-
tiffs in this case, the Court stated that it would not do so because it 
could not “conceive of an area of government activity in which the 
courts have less competence.”143  Thus, the Court held that “enlisted 
military personnel may not maintain a suit to recover damages from a 
superior officer for alleged constitutional violations.”144 
 
 138 Chappell, 462 U.S. at 297–98.  The plaintiffs also asked the Court to provide 
them with injunctive relief.  Id. 
 139 Id. at 301. 
 140 Id. at 302–03.  The Board for the Correction of Naval Records provides anoth-
er method by which a member of the military “‘may correct any military record . . . 
when [the Secretary of the Navy acting through the Board] considers it necessary to 
correct an error or remove an injustice.’”  Id. at 303 (quoting 10 U.S.C. § 1552(a) 
(1976)).  The Board has the discretion to promote the officer whose rights have 
been violated or provide him with back pay.  § 1552(a)(2), (c).  Further, a federal 
court can review and set aside any decision by the Board where evidence exists that 
shows that the Board’s decision is arbitrary, capricious, or not based on substantial 
facts.  See Grieg v. United States, 640 F.2d 1261, 1268 (Ct. Cl. 1981). 
 141 Chappell, 462 U.S. at 304.  Specifically, the Court remarked that a commanding 
officer’s “decisive action” and a subordinate’s “disciplined response” would both be 
undermined if the commanding officer were exposed to a judicially created damages 
remedy for his actions.  Id. 
 142 Id. 
 143 Id. at 302 (quoting Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10 (1973)). 
 144 Id. at 305. 
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In United States v. Stanley,145 the Court extended the reasoning of 
Chappell by foreclosing Bivens actions altogether in the context of mil-
itary service.146  The plaintiff in Stanley was an officer in the U.S. Army 
who was subject to a series of experiments by military scientists with-
out his knowledge and in contravention of his Fifth Amendment 
rights.147  Premising liability under Bivens, the plaintiff argued that 
Chappell was distinguishable from his case on the ground that Chappell 
involved constitutional misconduct by the plaintiffs’ commanding offic-
ers, and in the plaintiff’s case, the misconduct came at the hands of 
officers with no superior relationship to him.148  Because of that dis-
tinction, the plaintiff argued that he could not invoke intra-military 
remedies, such as the UCMJ, and, therefore, had no alternative re-
course.149  The plaintiff also argued that the “unique disciplinary 
structure” of the military was not implicated in his case, as it was in 
Chappell, because the defendants’ acts were not incidental to the 
plaintiff’s service.150 
The Court found both of the plaintiff’s arguments unavailing.  
The officer-subordinate relationship, according to the Court, was not 
crucial to the holding of Chappell.151  The Court in Chappell refrained 
from crafting an implied damages remedy based on Article I’s 
mandate “for Congress ‘to make Rules for the Government and Regu-
lation of the land and naval Forces.’”152  Thus, any Bivens remedy for 
injuries arising out of one’s service would necessarily disrupt the “mil-
itary regime” and undermine Congress’s constitutional authority in 
that area.153  Flatly rejecting the plaintiff’s other argument that his 
constitutional injuries were not incidental to his service,154 the Court 
found the case indistinguishable from Chappell.  Accordingly, the 
 
 145 483 U.S. 669 (1987). 
 146 Id. at 675–76. 
 147 Id. at 671–72.  The plaintiff was told by officers that the experiment would test 
the durability of newly issued military clothing and equipment against chemical at-
tacks.  Id.  In reality, however, the experiment was designed to test the effects of ly-
sergic acid diethylamide (LSD) on the human body.  Id.  Throughout the month-
long experiment, the officers periodically administered doses of LSD to the plaintiff 
while he slept.  Id.  The plaintiff first learned of the actual objectives of the experi-
ment seventeen years later when the military sent him a letter asking him to come 
back for follow-up studies.  Id. 
 148 Id. at 679. 
 149 Id. at 683. 
 150 Id. at 679–80. 
 151 Stanley, 483 U.S. at 680–81. 
 152 Id. at 682 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14). 
 153 Id. at 682–83. 
 154 Id. at 680–81. 
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Court considered it “irrelevant to a ‘special factors’ analysis whether 
the laws currently on the books afford[ed]” the plaintiff complete re-
lief to redress his injuries,155 and the Court suggested that Congress 
would have to decide whether to give recourse to officers “whenever 
the injury arises out of activity ‘incidental to service.’”156 
2. Special Factors: Upsetting a Comprehensive 
Congressional Statute 
Offense to the foundations of separation of powers also occurs 
where federal courts are asked to augment the remedies found in a 
comprehensive congressional statute with Bivens relief.157  Congress 
has the obligation and duty to legislate and fashion substantive laws 
and the tangential power to create remedies.158  The Constitution 
gives Congress that power, in part, because Congress is accountable 
to the people and is therefore competent to weigh multiple factors 
and make complex policy decisions.159  In light of those concerns, the 
Court has directed the federal tribunals to refrain from invoking Bi-
vens when the “design” of a statutory scheme suggests that Congress’s 
failure to include damages against federal officers as a possible reme-
dy is not inadvertent.160  The crucial factor triggering that Bivens ex-
ception relates to the statute’s comprehensiveness—both in terms of 
its breadth in regulating a field of federal activity and the remedies it 
offers for its violation.161 
 
 155 Id. at 683. 
 156 Id. at 684. 
 157 Wilkie v. Robbins, 127 S. Ct. 2588, 2598 (2007) (asking whether there is “any 
alternative, existing process for protecting the [constitutional] interest [that] 
amounts to a convincing reason for the Judicial Branch to refrain from providing a 
new and freestanding remedy in damages” (citing Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 378 
(1983))); Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 423 (1988). 
 158 Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 249–50 (1979) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Bi-
vens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 
411–12 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); see also Nichol, supra note 16, at 1143. 
 159 That is because a federal tribunal is limited to hearing and resolving only cer-
tain “cases” and “controversies” actually before the tribunal.  See U.S. CONST. art. III.  
Indeed, Congress is the body generally charged with making those decisions and 
finding consensus amongst conflicting viewpoints.  See, e.g., Chilicky, 487 U.S. at 425–
27; Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 52–53 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Bivens, 
403 U.S. at 412 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (noting that Congress “has the facilities and 
competence” for the task of creating legislation and accompanying remedies). 
 160 Chilicky, 487 U.S. at 423. 
 161 Id. at 423–27. 
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In Bush v. Lucas,162 the Court first invoked the special factors ex-
ception to deny Bivens relief because of the existence of a compre-
hensive statutory regime.163  Bush, an employee of the National Aero-
nautics and Space Administration (NASA), was demoted by his 
superiors because he told reporters that his job was worthless and a 
waste of taxpayer dollars.164  Claiming that he suffered retaliation for 
speaking his mind, Bush invoked his statutory right under the Civil 
Service Act to challenge his demotion as unlawful before the Federal 
Employee Appeals Authority (FEAA).165  The FEAA found no retalia-
tory firing, and Bush asked the Appeals Review Board of the Civil Ser-
vice Commission to rehear his claims.166  While the appeal was pend-
ing, Bush filed suit in state court (later removed to federal district 
court), premising liability against his supervisors under Bivens.167  Ar-
guing that the statutory remedies were incomplete because they did 
not authorize money damages against his superiors, Bush claimed 
that Bivens relief was necessary to fully redress his constitutional in-
jury.168 
 
 162 462 U.S. 367 (1983). 
 163 Id. at 367–68. 
 164 Id. at 369. 
 165 Id. at 369–70.  Under the version of the Civil Service Act in place at the time of 
Bush’s demotion, federal employees had the right to challenge any removal or de-
motion that was not made for reasons of efficiency.  5 U.S.C. §§ 7501(a), 7512(a) 
(1976); Exec. Order No. 10,988, § 14, 27 Fed. Reg. 551, 556 (Jan. 17, 1962); Exec. 
Order No. 11,491, § 22, 34 Fed. Reg. 17,605, 17,614 (Oct. 29, 1969).  Under that 
hodgepodge of rules and regulations, the federal agency pursuing the demotion was 
required to give to the employee thirty-days notice of the adverse action and the rea-
sons for the demotion.  5 C.F.R. § 752.202(a) (1975).  The employee, in turn, had 
the right to answer the charges, make sworn statements, and examine the evidence 
upon which the agency relied for the demotion.  § 752.202(b).  The agency had the 
ultimate discretion in deciding whether to provide an evidentiary hearing.  5 U.S.C. § 
7501(b) (1976); 5 U.S.C. § 7513(c) (Supp. V 1976); 5 C.F.R. § 752.404(g) (1983).  
The final decision regarding the employee’s demotion was placed in the hands of an 
officer in that agency who was of higher rank than the official who suggested the 
demotion.  5 C.F.R. § 752.202(f) (1975).  The employee had the right to appeal that 
decision to the FEAA.  §§ 752.203, 772.101.  On appeal, the FEAA, acting like a trial 
court, would conduct an evidentiary hearing, and the employee had the right to 
bring forth and cross-examine witnesses.  § 772.307(c).  The employee further had 
the right to judicial review of any adverse decision made by the FEAA, 5 U.S.C. § 
7703 (Supp. V 1976), and could also ask the Civil Service Commission’s Appeals Re-
view Board to reopen his case, 5 C.F.R. § 772.310 (1975).  The burdens of proof and 
persuasion were placed on the federal agency to show that it had sufficient cause for 
the demotion.  Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 385–88 nn.26–35 (1983).   
 166 Bush, 462 U.S. at 370.  Ultimately, the Appeals Review Board concluded that 
Bush’s demotion was unlawful and that Bush was entitled to $30,000 in back pay.  Id. 
 167 Id. at 371. 
 168 Id. at 372. 
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At the outset, the Court found no express or implied congres-
sional intent that the remedies in the Civil Service Act were meant to 
be exclusive.169  Thus, the case turned on whether “special factors” 
counseled against a new remedy in damages for Bush.  The Court cla-
rified that that exception required a federal court to “make the kind 
of remedial determination that is appropriate for a common-law tri-
bunal . . . before authorizing a new kind of federal litigation.”170  That 
“remedial determination,” the Court wrote, amounted to reasoned 
judicial discretion involving a balancing of the claimant’s need for 
damages against broader governmental and separation-of-powers 
concerns.171 
The Court found the existence of special factors for interrelated 
reasons.  Crucial to the Court’s analysis was the fact that Bush could 
obtain back pay and reinstatement of his position under the Civil 
Service Act, and although those remedies were incomplete, the re-
medies were nonetheless constitutionally adequate to vindicate his 
Free Speech right.172  As such, an implied damages remedy was not 
Bush’s only source of recourse, as in Bivens and Davis, and the Civil 
Service remedies were not ineffective in securing his constitutional 
rights, as in Carlson.173  According to the Court, that meant that Bush 
was simply asking for more relief than Congress had provided.174 
On the other hand, the Court viewed the Civil Service Act as a 
comprehensive statutory scheme that provided “meaningful” re-
course to federal employees.175  Indeed, the Court catalogued the his-
tory of the statute to emphasize that throughout the years Congress 
had carefully constructed the most appropriate remedies for misbe-
havior in the context of federal employment.176  The fact that Con-
gress excluded money damages as a possible remedy for someone in 
 
 169 Id. at 378. 
 170 Id. 
 171 Id. at 378–80. 
 172 Bush, 462 U.S. at 379 n.14.  Presumably, when the Court declared that the re-
medies under the Civil Service Act were constitutionally adequate, the Court meant 
that the remedies provided a certain minimum level of relief to the victim to com-
pensate him for his injuries, and that the remedies have a deterrent effect upon the 
wrongdoer.  Without the direct relief to the victim or the deterrent effect on the 
wrongdoer, the violated right would not be respected or protected from further inva-
sion. 
 173 Id. at 388. 
 174 Id. 
 175 Id. at 386. 
 176 Id. at 381–88. 
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Bush’s position, the Court wrote, was therefore not likely inadver-
tent.177 
Because of those reasons, the Court stated that 
[t]he question is not what remedy the court should provide for a 
wrong that would otherwise go unredressed.  It is whether an ela-
borate remedial system that has been constructed step by step, 
with careful attention to conflicting policy considerations, should 
be augmented by the creation of a new judicial remedy for the 
constitutional violation at issue.178 
In answering that question in the negative, the Court wrote that be-
cause of Congress’s historical and institutional capacity to make those 
types of policy decisions, it was up to Congress “to evaluate the impact 
of a new species of litigation between federal employees on the effi-
ciency of the civil service.”179  Accordingly, the Court concluded that it 
would not augment the Civil Service Act with a new remedy in dam-
ages for Bush simply to give him complete relief.180 
In Schweiker v. Chilicky,181 the Court again denied Bivens relief, but 
this time the Court based the denial on the existence of a federal 
benefits program.182  In Chilicky, the plaintiffs’ disability benefits un-
der Title II of the Social Security Act were terminated because state 
authorities administering the program determined that the plaintiffs’ 
various disabilities no longer existed.183  As per their statutory right 
under the Act, the plaintiffs challenged those decisions before an 
administrative law judge and succeeded in restoring their previously 
denied benefits.184  The plaintiffs then sued the federal officers who 
 
 177 Id. at 388–89. 
 178 Bush, 462 U.S. at 388. 
 179 Id. at 389. 
 180 Id. at 388–90. 
 181 487 U.S. 412 (1988). 
 182 Id. at 428–29. 
 183 Id. at 417.  Title II of the Social Security Act allows individuals to receive disa-
bility benefits if both of the following requirements are met: (1) the individual has 
paid into the social security program for a certain number of years; and (2) the indi-
vidual has a recognized physical or mental disability that prohibits the individual 
from being gainfully employed.  42 U.S.C. § 423(a), (d) (Supp. IV 1982).  Under 
Title II, designated state welfare agencies coordinate the program at the state level 
and provide benefits to disabled individuals who meet the above criteria so long as 
their disability persists.  Id. §§ 421(a), 423(a)(1).  To determine whether a disability 
persists, the Social Security Administration is required to review a beneficiary’s disa-
bility status every three years.  Id. § 421(i). 
 184 Chilicky, 487 U.S. at 417.  A Title II beneficiary who fails to carry his burden of 
proof before a continuing disability review board and loses his benefits is permitted 
to appeal that decision to an administrative law judge.  See 42 U.S.C. § 421(d) (Supp. 
ROBINSON (FINAL EDIT) 1/13/2010  5:25 PM 
2009] COMMENT 1383 
 
designed the disability review system, claiming that the entire review 
procedure had violated their due process rights and that that, in turn, 
had caused the denial of their benefits.185  The plaintiffs argued that a 
Bivens remedy was necessary because having their benefits restored 
after months of delay, which was the only remedy to which they were 
entitled under Title II, was wholly inadequate to protect their due 
process rights.186  Alternatively, the plaintiffs claimed that the restora-
tion of their benefits addressed the statutory violations of Title II but 
left them with no redress for their constitutional injuries.187 
The issue again before the Court was whether any special factors 
weighed against the creation of a new remedy in damages.188  Similar 
to Bush, the Court noted that the plaintiffs in this case could, and did, 
avail themselves of an alternative and adequate remedial process—
Title II—to vindicate their constitutional rights.189  The case therefore 
came down to whether the Court should augment the constitutionally 
sufficient Title II remedies, though lacking in a damages action 
against federal officers, with Bivens relief to make the plaintiffs 
whole.190  The Court cautioned against doing so and stated that the 
special factors exception 
has proved to include an appropriate judicial deference to indica-
tions that congressional inaction has not been inadvertent.  When 
the design of a Government program suggests that Congress has 
provided what it considers adequate remedial mechanisms for 
constitutional violations that may occur in the course of its admin-
istration, we have not created additional Bivens remedies.191 
 
IV 1982); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.929–404.965 (1987).  At the time that this case was before 
the Court, individuals who lost their benefits were not entitled to receive any pay-
ments while their appeal was pending before the administrative law judge.  Chilicky, 
487 U.S. at 415–17.  Further, Title II beneficiaries were not entitled to any judicial 
review by Article III courts for violations of any of the provisions of the Social Securi-
ty statute.  Id. 
 185 Chilicky, 487 U.S. at 418–19. 
 186 Id.  
 187 Id. at 418–20, 427.  The plaintiffs alleged that, as a result of their constitutional 
injuries, they suffered severe emotional distress as well as loss of food and shelter.  Id. 
at 419. 
 188 Id. at 422–23. 
 189 Id. at 425.  With little discussion, the Court stated that the restoration of bene-
fits was “meaningful” and considerably more elaborate than the remedies at issue in 
Bush.  Id.  Thus, the restoration of benefits was sufficient to vindicate the plaintiffs’ 
due process rights even though that remedy had resulted in months of delay and un-
justified hardship.  Id. 
 190 Id. 
 191 Chilicky, 487 U.S. at 423. 
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In concluding that Title II’s exclusion of damages against federal of-
ficers was not inadvertent, the Court emphasized the comprehensive 
nature of the statute (the Social Security Act “affect[ed] virtually 
every American”) and the fact that it provided “‘an unusually protec-
tive [multi]-step process for the review and adjudication of’” most vi-
olations of the statute, including the plaintiffs’ claims.192  The Court 
wrote that Congress likely chose not to make Title II officers liable in 
damages because of the resulting “difficulties and expense in recruit-
ing administrators for the [Title II] programs.”193  Any implied dam-
ages remedy, the Court stated, would therefore undermine Con-
gress’s decision to exempt Title II officers from the same.194 
As to the plaintiffs’ argument that the Title II remedies only ad-
dressed their statutory injuries, the Court found “no distinction be-
tween compensation for a ‘constitutional wrong’ and the restoration 
of statutory rights that ha[ve] been unconstitutionally taken away.”195  
The Court continued by stating that “statutory violations caused by 
unconstitutional conduct” do not “necessarily require remedies in 
addition to the remedies provided generally for such statutory viola-
tions.”196  Consequently, the Court ruled that special factors—
including the existence of a comprehensive statutory scheme—
precluded it from implying a new remedy in damages.197 
During the 2007 term, the Court again struck down Bivens relief 
for a claimant where statutory remedies were available even though 
the Court found that the statutory remedies lacked any inference of 
Bivens preclusion.  In Wilkie v. Robbins,198 the plaintiff, Frank Robbins, 
purchased land in Wyoming subject to a right-of-way easement held 
by the Federal Bureau of Land Management (BLM).199  When Rob-
bins took title to the land, however, BLM failed to rerecord its ease-
ment, thereby extinguishing its claim on the premises.200  After failing 
to convince Robbins to regrant the property interest, BLM employees 
engaged in a series of direct and covert tactics designed to force 
Robbins into submission.201  Over the course of six years, BLM em-
 
 192 Id. at 424 (quoting Heckler v. Day, 467 U.S. 104, 106 (1984)). 
 193 Id. at 425. 
 194 Id. at 425–26. 
 195 Id. at 427. 
 196 Id. 
 197 Chilicky, 487 U.S. at 428. 
 198 127 S. Ct. 2588 (2007). 
 199 Id. at 2593. 
 200 Id. 
 201 Id. at 2593–94. 
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ployees denied permits to Robbins, did not inform him of adminis-
trative review procedures, purposefully trespassed on Robbins’s lands, 
instigated and incited animosity between Robbins and his neighbors, 
broke into Robbins’s house to find evidence of possible permit viola-
tions, and secretly videotaped Robbins and the guests at his resort.202  
Robbins eventually sued several BLM officials under Bivens, claiming 
that the officers were retaliating against him for exercising his Fifth 
Amendment right to property by keeping the government off his 
lands.203 
The Court began by noting that for each specific act of wrong-
doing, Robbins had numerous ways to adequately redress his injuries, 
including state trespassing laws, administrative review procedures to 
challenge the denial of permits, and tort-based remedies for illegal 
invasion.204  At the same time, however, the Court stated that this 
“patchwork” of relief was significantly different from the remedial 
mechanisms that the Court found sufficient to preclude Bivens relief 
in Bush and Chilicky.205  Unlike Bush and Chilicky, where the compre-
hensiveness of the statutory regimes evidenced a congressional intent 
to exclude damages as a possible remedy,206 the Court noted that no 
comprehensive statute addressed Robbins’s claims.207  Instead, the 
“assemblage” of remedies available to Robbins required him to go be-
fore numerous state and federal forums and expend a considerable 
amount of time and money to redress his injuries.208  The Court con-
cluded that Robbins’s available relief neither raised the inference nor 
indicated that Congress intended to stay the Court’s “Bivens hand.”209 
But that did not end the Court’s inquiry.  According to the 
Court, Robbins was not entitled to Bivens relief simply because he had 
established that no congressional scheme existed that evidenced an 
intent to foreclose Bivens relief.210  Instead, the Court wrote, “any 
freestanding damages remedy for a claimed constitutional violation 
has to represent a judgment about the best way to implement a con-
stitutional guarantee; it is not an automatic entitlement no matter 
 
 202 Id. at 2594–96. 
 203 Id. at 2596–97. 
 204 Wilkie, 127 S. Ct. at 2598–99. 
 205 Id. at 2600. 
 206 Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 424–26 (1988); Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 
367, 381–88 (1983). 
 207 Wilkie, 127 S. Ct. at 2600. 
 208 Id. at 2600–01. 
 209 Id. at 2600. 
 210 Id. 
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what other means there may be to vindicate a protected interest.”211  
The Court continued by stating that the majority of the time, “Bivens 
relief is not the ‘best way’ to protect a constitutional right.”212  In fact, 
the Court noted only two circumstances where it had found Bivens re-
lief justified—for a plaintiff who had no other remedy and for a 
plaintiff who lacked effective alternative relief to vindicate the consti-
tutional right at issue.213  Robbins did not fall into either one of those 
categories.214  The Court, therefore, would have to rely on reasoned 
judgment to determine whether any other reasons suggested denying 
a damages remedy for Robbins against the BLM officials.215 
Ultimately, the Court denied Robbins any Bivens relief because 
of the “difficulty in defining a workable cause of action.”216  The 
Court’s prior Fifth Amendment retaliation cases premised liability 
upon a finding of improper purpose or motive.217  Here, the Court 
wrote, BLM officials had a proper purpose in harassing Robbins: “as a 
landowner, the Government may have, and in this instance does 
have, a valid interest in getting access to neighboring lands.”218  For 
Robbins to show that BLM officers deprived him of his constitutional 
rights, the Court would have to significantly alter its Fifth Amend-
ment retaliation jurisprudence.219  The Court declined to do so be-
cause it could not define the parameters of that proposed cause of ac-
tion, and the Court left it to Congress “‘to evaluate the impact of a 
new species of litigation’ against” public officials.220 
 
 211 Id. at 2597. 
 212 Id. 
 213 Wilkie, 127 S. Ct. at 2600. 
 214 Id. at 2597–98. 
 215 Id. at 2600. 
 216 Id. at 2601. 
 217 Id. 
 218 Id. 
 219 Wilkie, 127 S. Ct. at 2601–02.  For a concise overview of the Court’s retaliation 
jurisprudence, see generally Bd. of County Comm’rs, Wabaunsee Cty. v. Umbehr, 
518 U.S. 668 (1996) (holding that an employee who was fired for discussing a topic 
of public interest must show “that the conduct at issue was constitutionally protected, 
and that it was a substantial or motivating factor in the termination”); Rankin v. 
McPherson, 483 U.S. 378 (1987) (holding that the government may not retaliate 
against an individual who exercises his right to Free Speech); Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 
U.S. 70 (1973) (prohibiting government retaliation for exercising one’s Fifth 
Amendment right against self-incrimination). 
 220 Wilkie, 127 S. Ct. at 2605 (quoting Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 389 (1983)). 
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3. Special Factors: Extending Bivens Liability Beyond 
Federal Officers 
The federal courts’ hesitancy to embrace Bivens relief under the 
special-factors exception also stems from the courts’ own perceived 
incompetence or impotency to make the considered and multi-
faceted policy decisions that a damages action against federal actors 
generally entails.221  As noted in Carlson, one of the justifications for 
the Bivens doctrine is that it deters federal officers from acting un-
constitutionally.222  When plaintiffs ask the federal courts to extend 
Bivens actions against a new set of defendants, this institutional in-
competence takes center stage.223  Such policy decisions are generally 
deemed to be Congress’s prerogative and, thus, the Court has met 
with hostility any attempt to extend Bivens beyond its core purpose.224  
Instead, the Court has instructed the federal tribunals to let Congress 
establish liability against federal entities for their unlawful acts.225 
In Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation v. Meyer,226 the Court de-
clined to extend Bivens to claimed constitutional violations commit-
ted by federal agencies.  In that case, the plaintiff, John Meyer, was a 
senior manager of a California bank.227  When the bank became fi-
nancially insolvent, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board directed the 
Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) to act as 
the bank’s receiver under federal law.228  The FSLIC hired a special 
representative to direct the bank’s operations and, through that rep-
resentative, fired Meyer.229  Meyer then sued the representative and 
the FSLIC based on his assertion that they unlawfully denied him his 
 
 221 See, e.g., Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 425–27 (1988); Carlson v. Green, 
446 U.S. 14, 52–53 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named 
Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 412 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissent-
ing) (noting that Congress “has the facilities and competence” for the task of creat-
ing legislation and accompanying remedies). 
 222 Carlson, 446 U.S. at 21. 
 223 See, e.g., FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 486 (1994) (noting that “decisions involv-
ing ‘federal fiscal policy’ [by extending Bivens liability] are not [the Court’s] to 
make”) (internal quotation omitted). 
 224 Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 71 (2001). 
 225 Id. at 72. 
 226 510 U.S. 471 (1994). 
 227 Id. at 473. 
 228 Id.  As receiver, the FSLIC had the power to “take such action as may be neces-
sary to put [the bank] in a sound solvent condition.”  Id. (quoting National Housing 
Act, ch. 847, 48 Stat. 1259 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1729(b)(1)(A)(ii) 
(1934)) (repealed 1989)). 
 229 Id. 
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“property right . . . to continued employment” at the bank.230  A jury 
found the FSLIC liable under Bivens but denied relief against the 
special representative on qualified immunity grounds.231 
After determining that the FSLIC waived its sovereign immunity, 
the Court expressed doubt about permitting a Bivens remedy to stand 
against a federal agency.232  The Court stated that it created a frees-
tanding damages remedy in Bivens “in part because a direct action 
against the Government was not available.”233  Meyer had other ways 
to exact relief from the FSLIC based in administrative and contrac-
tual law,234 but Meyer chose not to invoke them because he would 
have had difficulty overcoming the defendant’s qualified-immunity 
defense.235  But issues of immunity, the Court explained, do not factor 
into its analysis of whether to sustain a Bivens claim.236  Rather, that 
decision depends entirely upon reasoned judgment unaffected by 
whether a particular defendant is judgment proof.237 
The Court then went on to reject the plaintiff’s Bivens claim 
against the FSLIC because a damages action against a federal agency 
would “eviscerat[e] . . . the Bivens remedy rather than [amount to] its 
extension.”238  The Court reasoned that, to get around immunity 
problems, any plaintiff, given the choice between suing a federal 
agency or a federal officer under Bivens, would always seek to hold 
the agency liable over the officer.239  If that were to happen, “the de-
terrent effects of the Bivens remedy would be lost.”240  The Court also 
remarked that an implied damages remedy was inappropriate be-
cause it would create “a potentially enormous financial burden for 
the Federal Government.”241  Because Congress normally made deci-
sions regarding “‘federal fiscal policy,’” the Court determined that 
 
 230 Id. at 474. 
 231 Id. at 473–74. 
 232 Meyer, 510 U.S. at 484. 
 233 Id. at 485 (citing Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Nar-
cotics, 403 U.S. 388, 410 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring)). 
 234 Id. at 485 n.10. 
 235 Id. at 485. 
 236 Id. 
 237 Id. 
 238 Meyer, 510 U.S. at 485. 
 239 Id. 
 240 Id. 
 241 Id. at 486. 
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Congress must also decide whether to extend Bivens liability against 
federal agencies.242 
In Correctional Services Corporation v. Malesko,243 the Court reite-
rated that Bivens liability does not extend beyond the unconstitution-
al acts of federal officers.244  In that case, the plaintiff, a federal pris-
oner, sued Correctional Services Corporation (“Corporation”), a 
private entity, for injuries he suffered because of the negligence of 
the Corporation’s employees.245  Although administrative remedies 
were available,246 the plaintiff instead alleged an Eighth Amendment 
violation against and sought monetary relief under Bivens from the 
Corporation and its negligent employees.247  The plaintiff argued that 
because the Corporation was acting under the color of federal law in 
operating the correctional facility,248 the deterrent purposes of Bivens 
would be served.249 
The Court held that private entities acting under the color of 
federal law cannot be liable under Bivens for monetary damages.250  
Relying heavily on Meyer, the Court stated that Bivens “is concerned 
solely with deterring the unconstitutional acts of individual offic-
ers.”251  And as individual officers would likely be judgment proof, ex-
tending Bivens liability to private entities, according to the Court, 
lacked any deterrent effect at all because a plaintiff would go after the 
private entity rather than the individual officers responsible.252  Reite-
rating that issues of immunity played no role in deciding whether to 
 
 242 Id. (quoting United States v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 332 U.S. 301, 311 
(1947)). 
 243 534 U.S. 61 (2001). 
 244 Id. at 73. 
 245 Id. at 64.  The plaintiff suffered from a heart condition that prevented him 
from overexerting himself.  Id.  Although aware of the plaintiff’s debilitating disease, 
the Corporation nonetheless placed the plaintiff in a fifth-floor room of the facility.  
Id.  When one of the Corporation’s employees forced the plaintiff to take the stairs 
to his room instead of using the elevator, the plaintiff suffered a heart attack, fell 
down the stairs, and was injured.  Id. 
 246 Id. at 72–74.  The Court noted that Malesko had numerous alternative reme-
dies at his disposal that were “at least as great, and in many respects greater, than an-
ything that could be had under Bivens.”  Id. 
 247 Id. at 64–65. 
 248 Id. at 64. 
 249 Malesko, 534 U.S. at 64.  The plaintiff sought compensatory and punitive dam-
ages.  Id. at 65. 
 250 Id. at 74. 
 251 Id. at 71. 
 252 Id. 
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sustain a Bivens claim,253 the Court concluded that Congress would 
have to make that type of liability decision against entities acting un-
der the color of federal law.254 
IV. PRECLUDING BIVENS EVEN FURTHER:  
ARE CRIMINAL LAWS THE NEXT STEP? 
Having catalogued the Court’s ambivalence, if not hostility, to-
ward crafting freestanding damages relief, the final question still re-
mains: can a criminal law remedy a constitutional violation such that 
a federal court would consider that criminal law to be a “sufficient 
reason” to refrain from using its Bivens power? 
Wilson is an obvious starting point.  In Wilson, the court found 
the IIPA insufficient to restrain its Bivens power because that statute 
lacked any indication that Congress purposefully desired that federal 
officers implicated under the act be free from civil damages, and, 
more broadly, the IIPA failed to give the Wilsons any sort of direct re-
compense for their constitutional injuries.255  Is there any room in this 
district court’s opinion to argue that where the design of a congres-
sional criminal law suggests Bivens preemption and that law also gives 
substantive relief to the victim of the unconstitutional act, a federal 
court therefore has enough justification to deny a claimant Bivens re-
lief?  Clearly, the Wilson Court’s first reason is seemingly easy to satisfy 
because Congress can suggest whatever it wants in a law’s text or legis-
lative history.256  Moreover, restitution as damages is commonly tied to 
criminal laws,257 which at least superficially addresses the concerns of 
the Wilson Court that the victim of an unconstitutional act be given 
some type of direct relief.  Do additional concerns, either inherent in 
the criminal process itself or external, militate against having a crim-
inal law vindicate a constitutional right that has been violated?  If so, 
what are they?  If not, what are the circumstances where a criminal 
law will remedy a constitutional violation?  Finally, what are the 
broader implications of this finding?  Answering those questions re-
quires several distinct inquiries.  First, how does a criminal remedy fit 
into one of the Bivens exceptions?  Second, can a criminal law carry 
 
 253 Id. at 70 (“Meyer made clear that the threat of litigation and liability will ade-
quately deter federal officers for Bivens purposes no matter that they may enjoy quali-
fied immunity . . . .”). 
 254 Id. at 72. 
 255 Wilson v. Libby, 498 F. Supp. 2d 74, 92–93 (D.D.C. 2007). 
 256 The Speech and Debate Clause of the Constitution protects members of Con-
gress from liability.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1. 
 257 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3663 (2006). 
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with it some form of relief to redress the victim of a constitutional in-
jury?  Third, is such relief ever adequate to vindicate the victim’s con-
stitutional right?  Fourth, what is the broader justification for a feder-
al court deferring or not deferring to a congressional criminal law 
instead of fashioning Bivens relief? 
A. A Criminal Law as a Bivens Exception 
At the outset, a criminal law must fit within one of the Bivens ex-
ceptions for it to stay a federal court’s power to fashion damages re-
lief.  As discussed above, the two exceptions to the Bivens doctrine are 
where Congress expressly declares a remedy to be exclusive (“When 
Congress Says So”) or when special factors counsel hesitation.258 
If a criminal law is to preclude Bivens relief at all, it would likely 
fit within the special-factors comprehensive-statutory-scheme excep-
tion.  Although the “When Congress Says So” exception is ostensibly 
easy to satisfy—all that needs to appear in the text of the law is some 
express statement that “this criminal law is intended to preempt any 
Bivens action for every constitutional violation herein”259—Congress 
has never done so in the past, and little indicates that Congress would 
do so in the future.260  Similarly, the special-factors military exception 
premises Bivens exclusion on grounds relating to Article I’s command 
for Congress to make regulations in regard to the military.261  Indeed, 
Stanley shows that the Court is not concerned with whether a claimant 
has an alternative remedy so much as the Court is concerned with the 
disruption of the “unique disciplinary structure of the military” that 
any Bivens remedy would cause.262  The existence of a criminal law 
then would not likely have any impact under the special-factors mili-
tary exception.263  Finally, the fact that a criminal law would likely de-
ter federal officers from acting unconstitutionally does not counsel 
against the creation of a freestanding remedy in damages.  The Bivens 
deterrence principle, or lack thereof, speaks to reasons why a federal 
court should not expand the doctrine rather than to justify why anoth-
 
 258 See supra Parts III.A–B. 
 259 See supra Part III.A. 
 260 Id.  Presumably, that is because an incredibly high failure rate for Bivens ac-
tions already exists such that Congress is not worried about preempting a judicially 
created damages remedy against federal officers.  See sources cited supra note 14. 
 261 United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 682–83 (1987). 
 262 Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 304 (1983). 
 263 Stanley, 483 U.S. at 683 (noting that “it is irrelevant to a ‘special factors’ analysis 
whether the laws currently on the books afford” the plaintiff complete relief to re-
dress his constitutional injuries). 
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er remedy is preferable to the exclusion of a freestanding damages re-
medy.264  As such, the question becomes how a criminal law fits into 
the special-factors comprehensive-statutory-scheme exception. 
B. A Criminal Law as a Special-Factors Comprehensive-Statutory-
Scheme Exception 
According to this subset of the special-factors exception, a Bivens 
remedy is inappropriate when “the design of a Government program” 
suggests that Congress purposefully excluded federal officers from 
monetary liability for violating provisions in the program.265  Wilkie in-
forms us that a statute’s breadth in regulating an area of federal activ-
ity and the remedial mechanisms that address such a statute’s viola-
tions are generally revealing and indicative of its design.266  Moreover, 
Bush and Chilicky support the proposition that a statute that both is 
pervasive in its scope and provides a mechanism that addresses most, 
if not all, injuries arising from its breach, creates the inference that 
Congress intended to preempt Bivens relief.267 
The Court has not expounded a definitive standard to gauge the 
comprehensiveness of a statutory regime.  What may be gleaned from 
the cases, however, is that the likeliest candidates for the “compre-
hensive” label are congressional regimes that create statutory rights 
and purport to govern exclusively the exercise of the rights created.268  
One need not look any further than Bush and Chilicky to illustrate 
that point.  The Civil Service Reform Act at issue in Bush protected 
federal employees who exercised their First Amendment rights from 
retaliation by their employers—a protection that did not previously 
exist.269  The Bush Court found the Act “comprehensive” because it 
was the only statute that regulated job security for federal employees, 
and it did so with great detail.270  Similarly, Title II of the Social Secu-
rity Act, under scrutiny in Chilicky, entitled certain Social Security re-
cipients to disability benefits.271  The Court there extended the “com-
 
 264 Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 71 (2001). 
 265 Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 423 (1988). 
 266 See Wilkie v. Robbins, 127 S. Ct. 2588, 2598–600 (2007). 
 267 Chilicky, 487 U.S. at 423–28; Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 381–88 (1983). 
 268 Chilicky, 487 U.S. at 423–28; Bush, 462 U.S. at 386–88.  That is not to say that 
only congressional regimes that create statutory rights may be deemed comprehen-
sive.  Having a statute that regulates or governs an existing right in a particular area 
potentially could be comprehensive in nature. 
 269 Bush, 462 U.S. at 381–86. 
 270 Id. at 388. 
 271 Chilicky, 487 U.S. at 414–17, 424–26. 
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prehensive” label to Title II because Title II exclusively defined and 
limited the scope of that benefits scheme.272  Decisions by lower fed-
eral courts give further support to that point because the courts have 
found the Privacy Act,273 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,274 
and the administrative scheme governing veterans’ benefits deci-
sions,275 all of which create and limit statutory rights, to be compre-
hensive in nature. 
The remedies for the violation of a comprehensive statute are al-
so particularly telling of whether Congress intended to preempt Bi-
vens relief.  According to Wilkie, a remedial mechanism must be part 
and parcel of the statutory regime giving rise to the violation: if the 
relief is “piecemeal” in nature and not codified together with a sta-
tute’s provisions, Congress likely did not think of precluding a frees-
tanding damages remedy.276  Wilkie also suggests that a remedial me-
chanism requiring a Bivens claimant to appear before various forums 
(i.e., administrative agencies and federal and state courts) to achieve 
sufficient recourse argues against Bivens preemption.277 
Additionally, the inference of congressional intent to preclude 
Bivens is likely strengthened when the remedial mechanism provides 
relief for most, if not all, of the statute’s violations.  Not uncommonly, 
Congress uses its power over jurisdiction to restrict a federal court to 
hearing only those claims arising directly under a particular statute.278  
A remedial scheme that limits federal-court jurisdiction to particular 
claims arising under a certain statute certainly gives further weight to 
the idea that the statutory remedies are meant to be exclusive.  Simi-
 
 272 Id. at 424–25. 
 273 Downie v. City of Middleburg Heights, 301 F.3d 688, 698–99 (6th Cir. 2002); 
Sullivan v. U.S. Postal Serv., 944 F. Supp. 191, 195–96 (W.D.N.Y. 1996); Williams v. 
Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 879 F. Supp. 578, 587–88 (E.D. Va. 1995). 
 274 Ethnic Employees of Library of Cong. v. Boorstin, 751 F.2d 1405, 1415–16 
(D.C. Cir. 1985). 
 275 Thomas v. Principi, 394 F.3d 970, 975–76 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
 276 Wilkie v. Robbins, 127 S. Ct. 2588, 2600 (2007). 
 277 Id.  That is not to suggest that a remedial mechanism directing a plaintiff to an 
administrative proceeding with a right of appeal to the federal judiciary would violate 
that principle.  See, e.g., Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 388–90 (1983) (holding that the 
remedies of the Civil Service Reform Act raised the inference that Congress intended 
to preclude Bivens relief even though, to obtain relief, the plaintiff had to appear be-
fore an administrative board with the right to appeal the board’s decision to federal 
district court).  Rather, that point builds upon the previous assertion that “piece-
meal” relief, where the Bivens claimant is forced to look to different statutes, regula-
tions, and the common law to find his relief, does not raise the inference of Bivens 
preclusion. 
 278 See, e.g., Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 429 n.3 (1988). 
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larly, a mechanism offering relief to all of the statute’s beneficiaries, 
rather than only to certain groups, gives credence to a congressional 
bias against Bivens relief.  That is not to say that the mechanism must 
give the beneficiaries complete relief against all violators of the sta-
tute.  Rather, when all, or substantially all, of the beneficiaries have 
some avenue of redress under the statute, Congress more likely con-
sidered and rejected other forms of relief than those expressly pro-
vided.  Indeed, that description unsurprisingly sounds strikingly simi-
lar to the doctrine of field preemption, and it has been persuasively 
argued that the two standards are similar, if not the same.279 
The Federal Food Stamp Program280 is an example of a congres-
sional scheme that comes close to the scenario just described.  First, 
the program is comprehensive in its scope: it is a federal-entitlement 
program administered by the states and designed to promote the 
health of low-income individuals.281  The program contains detailed 
provisions that govern the exercise and use of food stamps and de-
fines those eligible to participate.282 
Second, the Act contains a remedial mechanism to address viola-
tions of the program that likely raises the inference that the remedies 
found in the Act are meant to be exclusive.  Depending on the par-
ticular provision that is breached, power is vested in the Secretary of 
Agriculture to bring civil actions, including removal of households or 
food concerns from the program283 or monetary penalties against 
state agencies for transgressions.284  Individual households are also en-
titled to administrative and ultimately judicial review of a state agen-
cy’s decision to terminate their benefits.285  Finally, the Act makes it a 
crime for anyone to knowingly take or use a food stamp in an unau-
thorized manner.286  When an individual is convicted of that crime, 
 
 279 Betsy J. Grey, Preemption of Bivens Claims: How Clearly Must Congress Speak?, 70 
WASH. U. L.Q. 1087, 1127–29 (1992). 
 280 7 U.S.C. §§ 2011–2036 (2006). 
 281 Id. § 2011. 
 282 See id. §§ 2012–2019. 
 283 Id. §§ 2020–2021. 
 284 Id. §§ 2022, 2025(c). 
 285 Id. §§ 2020(e)(10), (i)(2), 2023. 
 286 7 U.S.C. § 2024(b)(1) (2006).  Specifically, the law states that 
whoever knowingly uses, transfers, acquires, alters, or possesses cou-
pons, authorization cards, or access devices in any manner contrary to 
this chapter or the regulations issued pursuant to this chapter shall . . . 
be guilt of a felony [if the coupons are valued at $100 or more] . . . or . 
. . of a misdemeanor [if the coupons are valued at $100 or less]. 
Id. 
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the statute requires forfeiture to the government of the stamps and 
any other property used in the commission of the crime and permits 
a court to order the defendant to work to pay “restitution for losses 
incurred by the United States.”287  Clearly, this criminal law is aimed at 
deterring and punishing the food-stamp recipients themselves for 
selling their benefits for profit, but the law can be read to apply to 
third parties who take and sell the food stamps of another.288  Thus, 
for all practical purposes, the Act contains remedies for nearly every 
contemplated transgression and gives the food-stamp recipients at 
least some protection and security of their statutory right. 
Under this statutory scheme, there may arise a scenario involving 
a food-stamp recipient whose home is broken into by federal Drug 
Enforcement officers acting upon an anonymous tip in search of evi-
dence relating to an alleged drug crime.  The officers seize the food 
stamps289 and, realizing that they entered the wrong house and that 
their search was illegal, dispose of the stamps to avoid culpability.  As 
the Bivens case itself tells us, state remedies for the illegal trespass, 
search, and seizure are “inconsistent or even hostile” to the individu-
al’s Fourth Amendment rights and likely unavailing for our low-
income beneficiary.290  Looking to federal remedies for help, the indi-
vidual has two forms of recourse under the Food Stamp Program: a 
criminal prosecution against the officers or a civil monetary penalty 
instituted by the Secretary of Agriculture against the officers.291  In ei-
ther situation, the individual has no possibility of recovery.292  Moreo-
ver, the Food Stamp Program purports to limit other federal reme-
dies beyond the four corners of the statute.293  If the Secretary of 
Agriculture determines that prosecuting the federal officers under 
the criminal law is the most appropriate way to proceed, the officers’ 
 
 287 Id. § 2024(b)(2), (c), (g), (h). 
 288 Id. § 2024(b)(1).  The broad language of that criminal law calls for punish-
ment for “whoever” misuses a food stamp and is not limited to members of qualified 
households who are guilty of misuse.  Id. 
 289 Notably, a “food stamp” is no longer a tangible item that can best be described 
as a physical stamp.  Instead, the monetary benefit that a household receives is ac-
cessible through an electronic card (similar to a debit or credit card) that members 
of the household possess and can use at qualified stores to purchase goods.  Id. § 
2016(i)(1). 
 290 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 
U.S. 388, 394 (1971). 
 291 7 U.S.C. §§  2021(f), 2024(b)(1) (2006). 
 292 Under the civil monetary penalty provision, damages awards go to the govern-
ment.  Id. § 2024(f). 
 293 Id. § 2022(a)(1). 
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conviction would entitle the government to restitution of the statuto-
ry benefit but would leave the victim wanting a remedy.294  Under 
those circumstances, if the victim brought a Bivens claim seeking 
monetary relief for the unconstitutional taking, a federal court ap-
parently would be presented with the precise question of whether 
Congress intended § 2024(b) of the Act to be the victim’s only re-
course in obtaining relief. 
C. Constitutional Adequacy of a Criminal Law 
To answer the above question of whether a criminal law could 
adequate redress a constitutional injury, a federal court must first de-
termine whether the statutory relief is constitutionally adequate.  Al-
though that principle is not noticeably apparent, Bush and Chilicky 
are particularly informative.  In both cases, the Court stressed that it 
was not faced with the task of implying a damages remedy in the face 
of constitutionally inadequate relief crafted by Congress.295  Instead, 
the Court was being asked to fashion Bivens relief when Congress al-
ready provided “meaningful” and “adequate” remedies to vindicate 
the underlying right.296  Wilkie gives further credence to that proposi-
tion.  In that case, the Court stated that it sustained Bivens remedies 
only in two types of cases: where a plaintiff lacked any congressional 
relief and where a plaintiff’s statutory relief was inadequate to secure 
his constitutional right.297  Thus, the Court seems to suggest, without 
directly saying, that the Court fashioned Bivens relief in those in-
stances, at least in part, because it found that the plaintiff’s relief was 
constitutionally inadequate.  To make that finding then, the Court 
must have independently assessed the constitutional adequacy of the 
statutory remedy before concluding that Bivens relief was inappro-
priate.298 
The role that the Court appears to have carved out for itself in 
ensuring the constitutional validity of a congressional remedy is rela-
 
 294 Id. § 2024(b)(2), (c), (g), (h). 
 295 Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 425 (1988); Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 
386 (1983). 
 296 Chilicky, 487 U.S. at 425; Bush, 462 U.S. at 386. 
 297 Wilkie v. Robbins, 127 S. Ct. 2588, 2597 (2007). 
 298 If the Court did not independently assess the constitutional adequacy of the 
statutory remedies at issue in Carlson and Davis, then the Court must have fashioned 
the Bivens remedies because Congress considered its own remedies to be constitu-
tionally inadequate.  And that proposition is highly unlikely (if not illogical). 
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tively uncontroversial.299  The federal judiciary has the duty to “say 
what the law is” and interpret the Constitution.300  If the judiciary 
were to mechanically defer to statutory remedies, the court would in 
effect be sanctioning Congress to put a stamp of constitutionality on 
Congress’s own relief without judicial scrutiny of that decision.  That 
abdication of the judicial power would not only appear to violate the 
Constitution but would also undermine the judicial branch’s legiti-
macy as protector of that document.  Because of those grave constitu-
tional repercussions, separation of powers arguably requires federal 
courts to independently review the constitutionality of any congres-
sional remedy. 
At this point, it is important to emphasize again that the Court’s 
Bivens cases strongly suggest that the federal court should decide 
whether to craft a freestanding remedy in damages.301  According to 
Bivens, Davis, and Carlson, the constitutionality of an alternative re-
medy is clearly material to the question of whether a federal court 
should fashion additional relief, but such an alternative remedy does 
not compel a federal court to act in a certain way.302  Ultimately, if it 
determines that the congressionally provided relief is constitutionally 
inadequate to vindicate the violated right, a federal court must de-
termine whether a Bivens damages remedy is nonetheless appropriate 
given the circumstances.303  That common law method of adjudication 
necessarily involves consideration of larger governmental concerns 
about whether to make federal officers liable in damages when Con-
gress has not done so. 
Thus, the next issue becomes whether the prosecution of a crim-
inal law is ever sufficient to guarantee a particular constitutional 
right.  The adequacy of a mode of relief necessarily depends on the 
right at issue and the context surrounding its deprivation.304  At the 
outset, however, it should be apparent that the victim of an unlawful 
 
 299 Most commentators agree that the federal judiciary has not entirely abdicated 
its role in gauging the constitutionality of congressional remedies.  See Bandes, supra 
note 100, at 320–22; Dellinger, supra note 16, at 1549; Nichol, supra note 16, at 1121. 
 300 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
 301 See supra Part II.B. 
 302 Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 421–22 (1988) (“The absence of statutory 
relief for a constitutional violation . . . does not by any means necessarily imply that 
courts should award money damages against the officers responsible for the viola-
tion.”). 
 303 Wilkie v. Robbins, 127 S. Ct. 2588, 2597, 2600–01 (2007). 
 304 See, e.g., FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 484 n.9 (1994) (noting that damages re-
medies are appropriate for certain types of constitutional violations but not for oth-
ers). 
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act must be able to receive some type of direct recompense—either 
retrospectively or prospectively—for any remedy to be deemed ade-
quate.305  For example, a torture victim’s claims for relief for an 
Eighth Amendment deprivation could hardly be satisfied merely by 
the criminal conviction of the responsible federal agents.  One who 
has suffered a legally cognizable injury must be afforded some type of 
recovery that is tangible and real to give substance to his violated in-
terest.306 
1. Restitution 
Few criminal laws provide direct relief to the victim.  The ob-
vious shortcoming of § 2024(b) of the Food Stamp Program is that it 
gives the government, rather than the victim, recovery from the de-
fendant for his crime.307  Section 2024(b) therefore falls short of alle-
viating the victim’s injury in a manner required by the Constitution. 
A criminal law, however, could possibly provide direct relief to 
the victim.  Restitution is the most obvious example.  Restitution re-
turns to the victim his property or the benefits denied to him as the 
result of a crime,308 but restitution does not provide him with com-
pensatory damages for the deprivation his rights.309 
When restitution is tied to a criminal law or statute, it is either 
mandatory or within the discretion of federal judges to provide that 
form of relief.310  Because constitutional rights are at stake, however, 
 
 305 Steinman, supra note 70, at 283, 321.  That may also be inferred from the 
Court’s language in Bush and Chilicky.  Part of the reason why the Court found the 
remedies implicated in those cases to be “meaningful” is because the victim of the 
unconstitutional act could directly benefit from their application.  Chilicky, 487 U.S. 
at 423–25; Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 386 (1983). 
 306 That is opposed to the psychological benefit that may arise from the satisfac-
tion of seeing the transgressor punished by the government and sent to jail or fined.  
See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 
388, 395–97 (1971); Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946); Marbury v. Madison, 5 
U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803); Nichol, supra note 16, at 1122.  But see Carey v. Pi-
phus, 435 U.S. 247, 254 (1978); Fallon, supra note 17, 329–39, 366–72. 
 307 7 U.S.C. § 2024(b)(2), (c), (g), (h) (2006). 
 308 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1428 (9th ed. 2009).  If the perpetrator of an illegal 
act cannot restore the ill-gotten property or benefits, restitution may take the form of 
monetary relief.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 4 
(Tentative Draft 2000).  Such monetary relief is usually determined with reference to 
the fair market value of the property or benefits at the time of restoration.  Id. §§ 4, 
48. 
 309 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 4 cmt. 
 310 See generally 18 U.S.C. § 3663 (2006) (providing discretionary restitution to the 
victims of certain enumerated crimes); id. § 3663A  (providing mandatory restitu-
tion). 
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relief should be guaranteed and not discretionary.  Indeed, a right is 
hardly adequately secured when the relief is contingent upon judicial 
notions of fairness rather than guaranteed to the victim. 
When mandatory restitution is required under a criminal law, 
the victim is afforded relief after the defendant is convicted of the 
crime.311  Generally speaking, the victim is given notice of the sentenc-
ing hearing and the right to submit sworn affidavits to the court stat-
ing the value of property or money taken by the defendant.312  The 
prosecution, however, has to prove the extent of the victim’s damages 
by a preponderance of the evidence.313  The victim’s affidavits are 
compiled into a presentence report, which is given to the sentencing 
judge.314  When a judge makes an order of restitution, the victim can 
enforce it in any jurisdiction and may ask for lump-sum or periodic 
payments.315 
2. The Circumstances in Which Restitution Is Adequate 
Even though restitution is not likely to fully compensate the vic-
tim of an unconstitutional act,316 it still may nonetheless be adequate 
given the type of constitutional injury asserted and circumstances sur-
rounding the violation.317  Without describing the universe of situa-
tions in which restitution could adequately redress a constitutional in-
jury, accurately describing at least a few instances in which the Court 
has found restitution to be sufficient is possible.  The most prominent 
example occurs, as in Bush and Chilicky, where the alleged constitu-
tional infringement results in the denial of a statutory benefit or 
right.  Here, the constitutional deprivation is indistinct from the sta-
tutory deprivation in question, and the restoration of the statutory 
right is sufficient to compensate both injuries.318  For example, the 
Chilicky Court expressly recognized that the return of a statutory 
right, which in that case was the collection of disability benefits after 
 
 311 Id. § 3664(a). 
 312 Id. § 3664(d)(2)(A)(iii)–(vi). 
 313 Id. § 3664(e). 
 314 Id. § 3664(d)(4). 
 315 Id. § 3664(f)(3)(A), (m)(1)(B). 
 316 See, e.g., Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 429 (1988) (holding that restora-
tion of disability benefits was incomplete but nonetheless satisfactory to fully redress 
plaintiffs’ constitutional injuries); Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 388 (1983) (holding 
that reinstatement of position and back payment for Free Speech retaliatory action 
was incomplete but sufficient to redress constitutional injuries). 
 317 See Chilicky, 487 U.S. at 428; Bush, 462 U.S. at 388. 
 318 Chilicky, 487 U.S. at 428–29. 
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months of suffering and delay, was enough to address the plaintiffs’ 
statutory claims as well as vindicate their due process right for the un-
lawful denial.319  Similarly, back payment and reinstatement of posi-
tion were adequate to secure the plaintiff’s guarantee of Free Speech 
in Bush even though the relief appeared to directly address statutory 
violations of the Civil Service Reform Act.320  Further, restitution is 
normally adequate when the alleged constitutional deprivation is one 
that involves a Takings Clause violation by federal officers.321 
Finally, the fact that a federal officer may be judgment proof 
does not render restitution, or any other form of relief, inadequate to 
vindicate a constitutional right.  Issues of immunity, according to 
Meyer and Malesko, are analytically distinct and entirely separate from 
the question of whether a federal court should fashion a new remedy 
in damages under Bivens.322  Indeed, the very purpose of a federal of-
ficer’s immunity is to protect him from culpability for his constitu-
tional transgressions.323  Therefore, to defeat the adequacy of an exist-
ing remedy that is in fact unobtainable because the federal defendant 
may shield himself from liability is no excuse. 
In the present context, a criminal law offering mandatory resti-
tution is likely to be substantively adequate in cases involving the tak-
ing of a property right, such as a statutory benefit or entitlement.  In 
such cases, the federal officer’s unconstitutional usurpation of the 
benefit violates the beneficiary’s statutory and constitutional rights.  
The return or restoration of that benefit is enough to compensate 
both injuries such that additional recourse under Bivens is unwar-
ranted. 
3. Procedural Concerns 
Although this Comment has addressed the Wilson Court’s twin 
concerns of congressional intent to preclude Bivens and giving the 
victim recourse, that does not end the inquiry into whether a criminal 
law can remedy a constitutional violation.  The existence of addition-
al aspects of any remedy that factor into the determination of wheth-
 
 319 Id. 
 320 Bush, 462 U.S. at 386;  see also Chilicky, 487 U.S. at 428 (describing Bush as 
standing for the proposition that when the constitutional injury cannot be separated 
from the statutory injury, the statutory remedy is generally sufficient to redress both 
claims). 
 321 See, e.g., United States v. Lewis, 342 F. Supp. 833, 836 (E.D. La. 1972). 
 322 Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 70–71 (2001); FDIC v. Meyer, 510 
U.S. 471, 485 (1994). 
 323 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). 
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er the remedy passes constitutional muster should be apparent.  In-
deed, the Court in Chilicky acknowledged as much by recognizing 
that additional “safeguards” are intertwined with any remedy and fac-
tor into its constitutionality.324  That shows that the Court was con-
cerned with the entire process of the alternative remedy when gauging 
its adequateness rather than the level or amount of relief.325  The de-
ficiency of an alternative congressional remedy in those procedural 
safeguards presumably is constitutionally inadequate and, thus, an in-
sufficient reason to stay a federal court’s Bivens power.  What the 
Court means by “procedural safeguards” is unclear, but that term 
seems to be rooted in our traditional notions of due process in giving 
the claimant notice and a fair opportunity to be heard.326  That seems 
relatively uncontroversial because a remedy could hardly be consi-
dered sufficient if the procedures or mechanisms required to invoke 
the remedy are nearly impossible to satisfy or at least unduly burden-
some to vindicate the underlying right. 
In respect of considering a criminal law’s “procedural safe-
guards” to measure its constitutional adequacy, some problems arise.  
The inherent procedural shortcomings of criminal laws, as compared 
to other tort-based forms of relief that the Court has found palatable 
to foreclose Bivens relief, are numerable.  First, criminal laws take the 
cause of action out of the hands of the victim and place it with the 
prosecution.327  In the context of the present discussion, that would 
mean that federal prosecutors (and ultimately the Executive Branch) 
would have the sole responsibility and power in vindicating a victim’s 
constitutional rights.  Generally speaking, third-party standing is only 
permissible under certain discrete circumstances.328  That prohibition 
 
 324 Chilicky, 487 U.S. at 425.  The Court emphasized in Chilicky the “elaborate” na-
ture of Title II of the Social Security Act, which contained a “[multi]-step process for 
the review and adjudication of disputed claims.”  Id. at 424 (citing Heckler v. Day, 
467 U.S. 104, 106 (1984)). 
 325 Id. 
 326 See, e.g., Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 228, 236 (1941). 
 327 See Edward A. Hartnett, The Standing of the United States: How Criminal Prosecu-
tions Show That Standing Doctrine Is Looking for Answers in All the Wrong Places, 97 MICH. 
L. REV. 2239, 2247 (1999) (“[O]ur long-standing practice (albeit one not required by 
Article III) is that the victim of the crime may not bring a federal criminal prosecu-
tion.”); see also Harold J. Kent, Executive Control Over Criminal Law Enforcement: Some 
Lessons From History, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 275, 293 (1989). 
 328 Where parties stand in such a relationship that the exercise of a person’s con-
stitutional right is dependent upon a third party being allowed to engage in particu-
lar conduct, the Court has found third-party standing permissible.  See, e.g., Craig v. 
Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 195–96 (1976).  Third-party standing is also permissible to chal-
lenge substantially overbroad statutes on Free Speech grounds even if the application 
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is not directly implicated here because the government has standing 
to prosecute the federal wrongdoer for his criminal act.329  Nonethe-
less, the proposition that a criminal law can vindicate a victim’s rights 
may indirectly undermine that principle.  The government’s reasons 
for prosecuting the federal wrongdoer may genuinely be at odds with, 
or tangential to, the victim’s desire to obtain relief.  That misalign-
ment of interests could very well lend itself to less-than-adequate re-
presentation on the prosecutor’s part and, ultimately, undermine the 
victim’s constitutional right itself. 
Further, having a criminal law act as a constitutional remedy may 
be particularly egregious to our notions of Due Process and Equal 
Protection.  Although the restitution process described above does 
give the victim the bare minimum of notice of the proceedings and 
an opportunity to submit sworn affidavits regarding the extent of his 
damages,330 the notice provision and opportunity to be heard come 
after the defendant’s conviction.331  Under the American criminal sys-
tem, the government is the prosecution and controls all aspects of the 
litigation, and the victim has only limited rights to immerse himself in 
the prosecution’s case-in-chief against the defendant.332  The govern-
 
of the statute is legal as applied to the plaintiff.  See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 
601, 615 (1973). 
 329 See Hartnett, supra note 327, at 2248–49; Jonathan R. Siegel, The Hidden Source 
of Congress’s Power to Abrogate State Sovereign Immunity, 73 TEX. L. REV. 539, 554 (1995). 
 330 18 U.S.C. § 3664(d)(2)(A)(iii)–(vi) (2006). 
 331 Id. § 3664(a). 
 332 A mandamus action is one way in which the victim of a crime may try to com-
pel a federal prosecutor to bring charges against the criminal actor.  Id. § 3771.  In 
fact, the Crime Victims’ Rights Act expressly grants the criminal victim the statutory 
right to immerse himself in the government’s criminal case against the defendant.  
Id. § 3771(a)(1)–(8).  To enforce those rights, the statute allows the criminal victim 
to seek mandamus against the prosecution.  Id. § 3771(d).  Specifically, those provi-
sions state the following: 
(1) Rights.—The crime victim or the crime victim’s lawful representa-
tive, and the attorney for the Government may assert the rights de-
scribed in subsection (a). . . . 
. . . . 
(3) Motion for relief and writ of mandamus.—The rights described in 
subsection (a) shall be asserted in the district court in which a defen-
dant is being prosecuted for the crime or, if no prosecution is under-
way, in the district court in the district in which the crime occurred.  
The district court shall take up and decide any motion asserting a vic-
tim’s right forthwith.  If the district court denies the relief sought, the 
movant may petition the court of appeals for a writ of mandamus. . . .  
The court of appeals shall take up and decide such application forth-
with within 72 hours after the petition has been filed.  In no event shall 
proceedings be stayed or subject to a continuance of more than five 
days for purposes of enforcing [this section].  If the court of appeals 
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ment’s discretion and authority not to prosecute a federal officer at 
all regardless of the victim’s need for recovery are especially offen-
sive.333  If that were to happen, the victim would be left wanting a re-
medy without any means of obtaining it.  In fact, a federal court may 
not even consider a criminal law within a comprehensive congres-
sional scheme as an alternative remedy to the plaintiff. 
Finally, the substantially higher burden of proof imposed in 
criminal cases as compared to civil cases is most problematic.334  Thus, 
the prosecution must go to great lengths to prove the defendant’s 
culpability before relief may be obtained by the victim.  Why should it 
be made harder to protect constitutional rights from invasion?  The 
idea that the criminal process should be a source of vindication for 
America’s most valued and treasured rights seems patently inconsis-
tent with the notion that the Constitution codifies those rights.  If an-
ything, constitutional rights should be easily vindicable to ensure and 
promote the values those rights embody and to keep the government 
within the parameters of the law. 
Although those reasons present a formidable barrier, they are 
not an absolute bar to viewing criminal laws as adequate to vindicate 
certain constitutional rights.  Initially, the prohibition on third-party 
 
denies the relief sought, the reasons for the denial shall be clearly 
stated on the record in a written opinion. 
Id. § 3771(d)(1), (3). 
But given the discretionary nature of the decision whether to prosecute, a man-
damus action would not likely succeed in most, if not all cases, given federal court 
hesitancy to compel federal actors to perform discretionary functions.  See Marbury v. 
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170–71 (1803) (“It is not by the office of the person 
to whom the writ is directed, but the nature of the thing to be done that the proprie-
ty or impropriety of issuing a mandamus, is to be determined.  Where the head of a 
department acts in a case, in which executive discretion is to be exercised; in which 
he is the mere organ of executive will; it is again repeated, that any application to a 
court to control, in any respect, his conduct, would be rejected without hesitation); 
see also Jarrett v. Ashcroft, 24 Fed. App’x 503, 504 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding that man-
damus action could not lie against Attorney General or United States Attorney to in-
vestigate or prosecute alleged civil rights violators); Jafree v. Barber, 689 F.2d 640, 
643 (7th Cir. 1982) (holding that investigation by FBI is a “clearly discretionary act” 
and that a federal district court lacked the authority to issue a writ of mandamus to 
force an employee of the FBI to initiate an investigation of an alleged crime). 
 333 The fact that federal prosecutors may not appeal an adverse judgment given 
the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Constitution is additionally offensive.  U.S. CONST. 
amend. V (“[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in 
jeopardy of life or limb”); see also Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 445–47 (1970). 
 334 To hold the accused liable for his actions, the prosecution is required to prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt all the elements of the crime.  See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 
530 U.S. 466, 477 (2000); United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 510 (1995); In re 
Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). 
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standing is only a prudential limitation on a party’s access to Article 
III courts.335  Arguments against criminal laws as a source of constitu-
tional vindication rest on the supposition that the victim is in the best 
position to assert his or her case.  The Court has made clear several 
times, however, that most Bivens claimants sit on their rights.336  Often 
times, a plaintiff does not seek relief for his injury because he believes 
that the federal officer will evade liability on qualified-immunity 
grounds.337  Many Bivens claimants, in fact, wait until the last minute 
to ask the federal judiciary to give them a better remedy.338  That “bet-
ter remedy” is generally unavailing, and a Bivens claimant is ultimately 
left with no relief whatsoever because of statute-of-limitations prob-
lems.339  Other instances exist in which an individual who has suffered 
a constitutional injury may not seek redress.  The victim may not even 
be aware that he has suffered a constitutional deprivation, may con-
sider the injury too insignificant to warrant civil action, or may lack 
the resources or time to pursue his claims. 
Building on that point, the federal government also acceptably 
could secure an injured party’s constitutional rights via the criminal 
process.  Federal prosecutors may have more resources and time to 
challenge the unlawful acts of a federal officer.  That is likely to be 
true when the Bivens claimant is indigent or on fixed income and re-
ceiving monetary assistance from federal-entitlement statutes, such as 
Title II or the Food Stamp program.  In such cases, the simple fact 
that litigation is expensive and time-consuming may dissuade a pri-
vate litigant from seeking the possibility of relief.  Moreover, a federal 
prosecutor’s independent interest in pursuing a criminal action may 
actually lend itself to greater zeal and tenacity in pursuing colorful or 
difficult-to-prove claims that the victim might not find worthwhile.  
Finally, federal prosecutors may have more legal training than a pri-
vate litigant, which may manifest itself in better representation of the 
victim’s interests. 
The more difficult question to address is in respect of the higher 
burden of proof standing in the way of a constitutional right’s vindi-
cation.  Obviously, Americans want their most treasured rights to be 
free from invasion, and consistent with that desire, the burden of 
 
 335 See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 194–96 (1976). 
 336 Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 72 (2001); FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 
471, 485 (1994). 
 337 Malesko, 534 U.S. at 72; Meyer, 510 U.S. at 485. 
 338 Malesko, 534 U.S. at 72 (noting that the plaintiff had failed to avail himself of 
available administrative remedies). 
 339 Id. 
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proof to establish a constitutional violation is generally placed at a 
lower threshold.  Even though the bar is set lower, however, the doc-
trines of absolute and qualified immunity and federal sovereignty 
seemingly make it more difficulty for the victim of an unconstitution-
al act to redress his injuries.340  Indeed, for constitutional injuries re-
sulting from the actions of a federal officer, qualified immunity will 
almost always present the victim with a sizeable obstacle that may be 
insurmountable in a given case and, thus, may ultimately result in the 
victim having no remedy.341  As Meyer and Malesko hold, issues of im-
munity do not factor into Bivens determinations.342  But the point to 
be made here is that a criminal law is not so clearly constitutionally 
inadequate because it imposes a higher burden of proof; other doc-
trines exist that make the easy vindication of a constitutional interest 
an illusion. 
D. Why a Criminal Law Should Vindicate a Constitutional Right 
The final and perhaps most difficult question to answer is why a 
federal court should show deference to a congressional scheme con-
taining only criminal laws as a source of constitutional vindication.  
As has been pressed throughout this Comment, Bivens is a common-
law doctrine of constitutional proportions: a federal court has the 
power, but not the duty, to fashion damages relief as it sees fit for al-
leged constitutional violations committed by federal officers.343  Cru-
cial to any federal court’s decision regarding Bivens liability has been 
whether the claimant has access to an adequate, alternative remedial 
process.344  When he does, his need for a judicially created remedy is 
viewed as less pressing than in the case of a claimant who has no re-
medy, and other separation-of-powers concerns, such as the need to 
show deference to a comprehensive statutory scheme, are likely to 
outweigh the claimant’s Bivens demands.345 
 
 340 See generally Maine v. Alden, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (holding that sovereign im-
munity prevents a state from being sued in its own courts under federal causes of ac-
tion); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982) (holding that state officers generally 
have qualified immunity from suits for damages unless the officers have violated 
clearly established constitutional rights that a reasonable officer would have known 
were being violated); see also Fallon, supra note 17, at 329–39, 366–72. 
 341 Meyer, 510 U.S. at 485. 
 342 Malesko, 534 U.S. at 70 (noting that “Meyer made clear that the threat of litiga-
tion and liability will adequately deter federal officers for Bivens purposes no matter 
that they may enjoy qualified immunity”); Meyer, 510 U.S. at 485. 
 343 See supra Parts II.B, III.A. 
 344 Wilkie v. Robbins, 127 S. Ct. 2588, 2598 (2007). 
 345 See supra Part III.B.2. 
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The result of that process has arguably provided Congress great-
er authority and leeway in giving effect and substance to constitution-
al norms.  At face value, that result is attractive: because Congress is 
accountable to the people, Congress should have the primary respon-
sibility of shaping relief for deprivations of constitutional values.  
That result also seems justifiable on a separation-of-powers ground.  
When Congress creates a statutory right, Congress makes a policy de-
cision as to the appropriate relief for the deprivation of that right.346  
Congress can decide that the right is not important enough to war-
rant significant protection even in the face of unconstitutional in-
fringement upon that right.  Congress can also decide that the feder-
al government is better equipped or in a better position to handle all 
violations of the right even when such a violation implicates the Con-
stitution.  In essence, a statutory benefit vindicable only through the 
criminal process may reflect Congress’s attitudes toward that right.  
Regardless of congressional motive, the federal judiciary should re-
spect and defer to the democratically elected branch’s determination 
of appropriate relief for a statutory, and ultimately constitutional, in-
jury. 
Even assuming, as Justice Harlan stated in Bivens, that the Bill of 
Rights exists to protect an individual’s interests from the majority’s 
will, which is expressed in the legislature, that does not lead to the 
conclusion that federal courts must therefore actively announce con-
stitutional norms without showing deference to Congress.  Indeed, 
Justice Harlan himself justified the Court’s creation of a remedy in 
Bivens by noting that a damages action brought directly under the 
Constitution by a remedy-less claimant would be a very rare occa-
sion347 and that no strong countervailing federal interests were at 
stake.348  Moreover, the Court’s envisioned role in Bivens actions has 
not led to a total abdication of its power to interpret and establish 
those norms.  The Court has routinely and independently assessed 
the constitutionality of the congressional remedies in its Bivens cases 
and has been willing to give damages when it finds the congressional 
 
 346 Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 249–50 (1979) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Bi-
vens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 
411–12 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); see also Nichol, supra note 16, at 1143. 
 347 Bivens, 403 U.S. at 409–11 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 348 Id. at 411 (“Of course, for a variety of reasons, the [Bivens] remedy may not of-
ten be sought. . . .  I deem it proper to venture the thought that at the very least [the 
Bivens] remedy would be available for the most flagrant and patently unjustified sorts 
of police conduct.”). 
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relief constitutionally inadequate.349  Thus, the Court has effectively 
staked out a middle ground between its dual needs to protect indi-
vidual rights and to defer to Congress’s authority to create constitu-
tional remedies.  Therefore, a federal court’s cessation of its Bivens 
power because of the existence of a criminal law fits within the 
framework that the Court has constructed in which the courts defer 
to congressional remedies where those remedies are adequate to se-
cure a constitutional right. 
Additionally, federal courts preferably should permit Congress 
to experiment with unconventional or atypical constitutional reme-
dies.  The simple fact that Congress has failed to provide the “tradi-
tional” relief of damages does not, and should not, imply that Con-
gress has not created a mechanism that will adequately safeguard a 
victim’s constitutional rights.  In fact, given the punitive nature of 
criminal laws, it may be that a victim’s constitutional guarantees will 
be more secure under the unconventional scheme created by Con-
gress than if a damages remedy were available to enforce the right at 
issue.  In the context of certain statutory schemes, criminal laws may 
be the easiest method—at least compared to a damages action—of cir-
cumscribing unconstitutional conduct. 
Finally, if a criminal law is still undesirable as a constitutional 
remedy even though such a remedy may represent congressional pre-
ference, a criminal law may still preclude Bivens relief where the Bi-
vens claim is brought after a successful criminal prosecution.  Consid-
er a comprehensive congressional scheme like the Food Stamp 
program that entitles certain individuals with a benefit and uses crim-
inal laws with mandatory restitution to enforce its provisions.  Even if 
a federal court believes that the criminal law lacks the procedural sa-
feguards necessary for the security of the constitutional right at issue, 
the victim has already obtained substantively adequate relief as a re-
sult of the prior criminal conviction and restitution.  Thus, the feder-
al court must decide whether Bivens relief is permissible when an in-
adequate process has resulted in adequate relief.  Under that narrow 
circumstance, preclusion of Bivens relief might be acceptable because 
the victim’s injury is redressed, and a federal court would have little 
incentive to fashion a new damages remedy, especially with the likely 
separation-of-powers criticisms that come with any Bivens decision. 
 
 349 Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 70 (2001). 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Attempting to fit a criminal remedy with mandatory restitution 
within the Court’s jurisprudence of declining to extend Bivens-type 
remedies is not an easy task.  The Bivens case dealt with the power of 
a federal court to give a civil damages remedy to an individual whose 
constitutional rights had been violated by a federal officer.  In the 
cases subsequent to Bivens, the Court has substantially dealt with the 
same question of whether fashioning such a remedy for a constitu-
tional violation without statutory authorization is prudent.  Substitut-
ing a Bivens tort remedy for a congressionally created criminal action 
with mandatory restitution seems patently illogical given the Court’s 
jurisprudence in that area.  But that statement fails to consider the 
core concerns of the Court when presented with a Bivens claim. 
As the Court has made clear many times, Bivens and its progeny 
are really about the federal judiciary and Congress deterring federal 
officers from violating the Constitution.  Grandiose themes of separa-
tion of powers and institutional competency resonate loudly 
throughout those cases, and often times the victim’s demands for full 
and complete compensation are lost in the cacophony.  That discord 
reflects the enormous discomfort that the Court feels in embracing 
its implied remedy-making power, which is further exacerbated when 
Congress has provided alternative relief for constitutional infringe-
ments. 
A criminal law with mandatory restitution is, at one level, no dif-
ferent from any other congressionally created remedy in the context 
of Bivens.  The completeness or form of the relief is not in question 
when a Bivens case comes before a federal court; the question is 
whether the federal judiciary finds a convincing reason to fashion a 
new damages remedy.  The recent trend in Bivens jurisprudence is to 
deny an implied damages action if the victim has any alternative fed-
eral remedies at his disposal.  Taking the leap to preclude a Bivens 
remedy based on the existence of an alternative criminal law with 
mandatory restitution is not as farfetched as it seems at first glance, as 
that form of relief arguably satisfies the minimum criteria to be con-
stitutionally adequate.  Therefore, given the appropriate circums-
tances, a federal court may decide, under its traditional common-law 
powers, that a criminal law with mandatory restitution may be an ac-
ceptable way to vindicate a constitutional right and, thus, that an im-
plied damages remedy under Bivens is unnecessary. 
 
